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REPRESENTING SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
ALICIA E. PLERHOPLES*
This article explores the representation of social enterprises—i.e.,
nonprofit and for-profit organizations whose managers strategically
and purposefully work to create social, environmental, and economic
value or achieve a social good through business techniques—in the
Social Enterprise & Nonprofit Law Clinic at Georgetown University
Law Center. The choice to represent social enterprise clients facili-
tates a curriculum that explicitly focuses on the business models, gov-
ernance tools, and legal mechanisms that these organizations use to
accomplish sustainability and charitable objectives. By serving social
enterprise clients, clinic students learn to solve novel and unstructured
problems and engage in information sharing and knowledge creation
essential to legal advocacy. Legal issues unique to social enterprises
compel clinic students to question corporate law and its underlying
normative values and employ transactional lawyering for public in-
terest purposes.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary corporate law scholarship espouses that the pri-
mary purpose of the corporation is to maximize share value for share-
holders. Shareholder wealth maximization has been used to describe
both the positive foundation and normative goals of corporate law.1
Many criticize this version of corporate law as prioritizing the interests
of shareholders and discounting the interests of nonshareholder con-
stituents of corporations including employees, creditors, suppliers, and
customers. At its worst, such critics claim, the shareholder wealth
maximization norm promotes short-term thinking on the part of cor-
porate boards and managers at great cost to communities where cor-
porations operate, as well as to corporations themselves.2
1 See generally ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituency Statutes: Po-
tential for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2265 (1990) (“[T]he ‘best interests of the corpora-
tion’ are equated with ‘corporate profit and shareholder gain.’”); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993) (arguing that corporate law doctrine does and should
prioritize shareholder wealth maximization to the exclusion of other interests); A. A.
Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (argu-
ing that management should exercise its authority only for the benefit of shareholders);
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33. Contra E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1153-54 (1932) (responding to Professor
Berle’s article and arguing that corporations have an additional social purpose); Ronald M.
Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders, Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409 (1993); Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge
v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 171 (2008) (arguing that, except for Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., the Delaware courts have “never actually sanc-
tion[ed] directors for failing to maximize shareholder wealth”).
2 A business strategy that focuses on short-term profit can be antithetical to sus-
tainability goals. While sustainability requires long-term thinking for the benefit of future
generations and the future planet, corporations focused on short-term gains or benefits are
apt to create more negative externalities. According to Greenfield, “this is because . . . in
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The academic debate about corporate purpose is informed by ac-
tual corporate performance and behavior. While some corporations
focus on shareholders and short-term profits, a growing group of cor-
porations emphasize long-term performance, social and environmen-
tal sustainability, and the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders;
often through corporate governance mechanisms that are imbedded in
a distinct sustainability culture.3 “Sustainability”—the capacity to en-
dure—is a concept that has historically been the purview of environ-
mentalists who use the term to refer to the long-term endurance of the
natural world. Increasingly, corporate managers, investors, and other
corporate stakeholders are applying the term “sustainability” to busi-
ness, and in a manner that encompasses more than environmental
goals. “Sustainable business” refers to operating a business in a man-
ner that has a positive impact or lessens corporate harms on the indi-
the long run the interests of corporations conflate with those of society as a whole . . . .
Short-termism is also costly economically, since the economy as a whole benefits when
companies have a long-term strategy. The economy is the summation of the fortunes of the
millions of companies and individuals that make it up; if most companies make decisions
that prioritize the short-term at the expense of the long-term, we all suffer.” The counter-
point, however, is that in an efficient market, management decisions based on short-term
strategies that hurt long-term company interests will be reflected in the share price because
in a perfectly efficient market, share price is the sum of all expected future dividends and
payouts discounted by present value. Nonetheless, the reality is that markets are not per-
fectly efficient, and it is difficult for investors to determine which strategies are based on
short-termism and which are based on long-term thinking. Managers can hide their busi-
ness strategies from the market. See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH:
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC
(2012); Kent Greenfield, The Problem of Short-termism, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627,
627 (2011); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 2.01, Comment (f) (acknowledging that
“long-run profitability and shareholder gain are at the core of the economic objective” of
the corporation, and that the corporation creates “interdependencies” between various
stakeholders that must be fairly managed); LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRE-
SPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT 4-5 (2001) (arguing that short-term manage-
ment is irresponsible, leading to “layoffs, plant closings, alienated workers, unsafe
products, and a polluted environment, all in the name of today’s profit”); Justin Fox & Jay
W. Losch, What Good are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 2012, at 57 (critiqu-
ing reliance on the concept of shareholders as owners of the corporation, arguing that the
increase in short-term shareholders has detrimental effects on the corporation, and advo-
cating for the involvement of other stakeholders and long-term shareholder involvement in
corporate governance).
3 Robert G. Eccles et al., The Impact of a Corporate Culture of Sustainability on Cor-
porate Behavior and Performance 2, 5 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-035, 2012)
(describing “sustainability culture” as a voluntary and explicit integration of social and
environmental values, beliefs, policies, and practices into the underlying culture of the bus-
iness, and finding that “high sustainability” companies have distinct characteristics such as
“a governance structure that accounts for the environmental and social impact of the com-
pany in addition to financial performance, a long-term approach towards maximizing inter-
temporal profits, an active stakeholder management process, and more developed mea-
surement and reporting systems.”).
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viduals, communities, and the environment with which the business
interacts. Businesses—as large-scale economic actors that assemble
capital, produce and distribute goods and services, and make invest-
ments—have been called to task for contributing to environmental,
financial, and social problems such as climate change, increased global
demand for natural resources, and economic disparity and inequality
that creates civil unrest and political pressure. As businesses face
these challenges, they have several options. Will they respond in ways
that mitigate or exacerbate these challenges? Will corporate actors at-
tempt to balance often disparate but sometimes synergistic environ-
mental, social, and financial interests? What systems, standards,
policies, and practices encourage and reflect sustainability in the cor-
porate sector?4
These are some of the questions that confront law students in the
Social Enterprise and Nonprofit Law Clinic at Georgetown University
Law Center (SENL Clinic).5 In the SENL Clinic, Georgetown law stu-
dents serve the business and transactional legal needs of social entre-
preneurs and nonprofit organizations in the District of Columbia and
internationally. The Clinic’s educational goals are to: (i) teach law stu-
dents the materials, expectations, and methods of transactional law-
yering and (ii) introduce law students to transactional lawyering in the
public interest.6
4 See also John Elkington, Governance for Sustainability, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE:
INT’L REV. 522, 524 (2006) (asking similar questions and noting that the sustainability
agenda “is the responsibility of the corporate board . . . . The better the system of corpo-
rate governance, the greater the chance that we can build towards genuinely sustainable
capitalism.”).
5 The Social Entrepreneurship and the Law Practicum was first offered during the
Spring 2013 semester and is a precursor to the Social Enterprise and Nonprofit Law Clinic,
which launched with the Fall 2013 semester. I have been engaged in the selection and
representation of social enterprises as clients for a transactional law clinic since 2008, when
I was a Clinical Teaching Fellow with the Organizations & Transactions Clinic at Stanford
Law School, and subsequently a visiting assistant professor at University of California,
Hastings College of the Law from 2010 to 2013. The Social Enterprise and Nonprofit Law
Clinic is the second transactional law clinic at Georgetown Law. The Harrison Institute for
Housing and Community Development is the first transactional law clinic at Georgetown
University Law Center and one of the longest-operating clinics at a U.S. law school.
6 Numerous articles have been written about the missions and pedagogical objectives
of law clinics in general, and more recently about transactional law clinics that practice in
the field of community economic development. See, e.g., Alicia Alvarez, Community De-
velopment Clinics: What Does Poverty Have to Do With Them?, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1269 (2007); Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood,
32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67 (2000); Laurie Hauber, Promoting Economic Justice
Through Transactional Community-Centered Lawyering, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3
(2007); Susan R. Jones, Promoting Social and Economic Justice Through Interdisciplinary
Work in Transactional Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 249 (2004); Susan R. Jones, Small
Business and Community Economic Development: Transactional Lawyering for Social
Change and Economic Justice, 4 CLIN. L. REV. 195 (1997). Fewer articles describe the work
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SENL Clinic students study corporate governance, i.e., the sys-
tems that govern the relationships of a firm’s management, board,
shareholders, and other stakeholders as well as the “structure through
which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attain-
ing those objectives and monitoring [the company’s] performance.”7
Students engage in corporate governance legal work that corporate
counsel typically perform: review and revise organizational documents
and governance policies that affect their clients’ internal and external
operations; advise clients on optimal business forms; identify, analyze,
and recommend operational and strategic improvements for manage-
ment’s use; and draft contracts and manage transactions on behalf of
their clients.
However, the SENL Clinic explicitly emphasizes legal and non-
legal sustainable strategies and practices used in the social enterprise
and corporate sectors.8 Corporate leaders are increasingly focusing on
sustainability issues and targeting governance practices as a method of
achieving sustainability goals.9 Some also argue that sustainability in
the corporate sector is unavoidable; driving both organizational and
of transactional law clinics that represent businesses or nonprofit organizations outside of
community economic development agendas. See, e.g., Kosuri, “Impact” in 3D, infra note 8;
Jay A. Mitchell, Getting into the Field, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 69 (2011) (describing the
experience of students in the transactional law clinic at Stanford Law School in represent-
ing nonprofit clients in the food system sector); Amanda Spratley, Connecting Law and
Creativity: The Role of Lawyers in Supporting Creative and Innovative Economic Develop-
ment, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 221 (2012) (describing how transactional lawyers and the
transactional clinic at George Washington University Law School contribute to the devel-
opment of the creative economy).
7 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Principles of Cor-
porate Governance 11 (2004).
8 Few scholars have addressed transactional clinics’ service to social enterprise clients
explicitly. See, e.g., Susan R. Jones, Current Issues in the Changing Roles and Practices of
Community Economic Development Lawyers, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 437, 443-47 (2002) (dis-
cussing the effect that social venture philanthropy and social entrepreneurship principles
will have on community economic development work); Praveen Kosuri, “Impact” in 3D—
Maximizing Impact Through Transactional Clinics, 18 CLIN. L. REV. 1 (2011) [herein
Kosuri, “Impact” in 3D] (discussing the social impact that a clinic can make by serving
social ventures, among other organizational clients). Admittedly, transactional law clinics
have engaged social enterprise clients since such clinics began in the 1970s. However, social
enterprise has only been defined as such in recent years, as it has been widely adopted and
supported by academics, entrepreneurs, investors, foundations, and politicians. One can
aptly call this new phase of mission-driven business a “movement,” distinct from previous
iterations.
9 See Eccles, supra note 3, at 5 (noting the various corporate governance practices that
characterize “high sustainability” companies, such as assigning responsibility for sustaina-
ble outcomes to the board of directors, forming a board committee on sustainability, con-
sidering environmental, social, and “external perception” when making executive
compensation decisions, training managers in stakeholder engagement, creating an official
stakeholder engagement process with feedback reported directly to board of directors,
etc.); see infra Part IIA.
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technological innovation.10 Understanding sustainable business is an
essential skill for law graduates who want to practice business law.
And law schools, which have been criticized for failing to maintain
pace with changes in the legal profession,11 should prepare law stu-
dents for this emerging sector of corporate law practice.
Given the Clinic’s pedagogical objectives, representing social en-
terprises is a natural fit. Because a “live-client” clinic’s principal teach-
ing method is legal representation of clients, client selection is critical
in setting and meeting pedagogical objectives.12 There are synergies
between learning sustainable strategies and practices, and represent-
ing social enterprise clients. There is no single definition of social en-
terprise or the various other terms used to describe for-profit and
nonprofit ventures that strategically pursue and create social, environ-
mental, and financial value to achieve greater sustainability or address
a social or environmental problem.13 Many social enterprises attempt
10 See Ram Nidumolu et al., Why Sustainability Is Now the Key Driver of Innovation,
HARV. BUS. REV. MAG. (Sept. 2009), http://hbr.org/2009/09/why-sustainability-is-now-the-
key-driver-of-innovation/es (arguing that competitors that do not make operations sustain-
able will be at a competitive disadvantage to those that do). Sustainability is also unavoida-
ble in the sense that we will all eventually sink or swim (forgive the pun) given the
oncoming disruption that climate change will cause. See also Matteo Tonello, Charting a
Path to Sustainability Leadership, THE HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
AND FIN. REG. (Dec. 13, 2012, 9:02 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/12/13/
charting-a-path-to-sustainability-leadership/ (“Not surprisingly, given the intense global
competition for resources, talent, and market share, corporate sustainability has emerged
as a new leadership benchmark. Especially among the largest and most influential corpora-
tions—those that control a large portion of the world’s physical resources as well as its
human and economic capital—sustainability is an increasingly important factor in both
competitiveness and risk management. Corporate practices are scrutinized more closely
than ever, and markets, supply chain partners, employees, regulators, and communities are
all demanding proof of sustainable performance from these companies.”).
11 See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012); Peter Latman, NYU
Law Plans Overhaul of Students’ Third Year, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2012), http://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2012/10/16/n-y-u-law-plans-overhaul-of-students-third-year/ (noting NYU
Law School’s change to its curriculum in response to this criticism). Law schools have been
criticized for not teaching transactional lawyering, in particular. See, e.g., George W. Dent
Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS. LAW. 279 (2009) (discussing the
implications of his study of the value added by transactional lawyers on law school
curriculums).
12 CLINICAL ANTHOLOGY: READINGS FOR LIVE-CLIENT CLINICS 59 (Frank S. Bloch et
al. eds., 2d ed. 2011) (“The cases are the primary ‘teaching materials’ in a clinical course; in
effect, they set the course’s educational objectives. Case selection is, therefore, among a
clinical teacher’s most important responsibilities. The types of cases students handle in a
clinic determine not only which areas of law they will have to learn, but also which skills
they will have to master and with which actors and institutions they will have to interact.”).
13 Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks?: Applying Traditional Cor-
porate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J.
BUS. L. 221 (2012); see also JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOT-
TOM LINE OF 21ST CENTURY BUSINESS (1997) (describing social enterprise as the pursuit of
“people, profit and planet”); Robert A. Wexler, Effective Social Enterprise – A Menu of
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to solve social or environmental problems while also pursuing finan-
cial returns for themselves and their investors; others do so in non-
profit organizational forms so as to reinvest financial returns in the
nonprofit organization. Many social enterprises employ innovative
business models and governance structures.
The choice to represent social enterprise clients facilitates a dy-
namic curriculum in a transactional law clinic. First, serving social en-
terprise clients helps introduce students to law practice in a corporate
sector that increasingly emphasizes sustainability. Students learn
about sustainability strategies and initiatives in the social enterprise
and corporate sector14 and gain an understanding of an emerging
practice area.15 Second, serving social enterprise clients provides stu-
dents with the opportunity to critically examine corporate laws and
norms that perpetuate corporate harms to the communities and the
environment in which they operate, just as clinic students working in
low-income communities examine laws and norms that perpetuate
poverty and inequality. Students also begin to evaluate modern corpo-
rate legal theories that are the basis of state corporate governance
law, with an eye towards rethinking corporate governance strategies
and practices to meet social enterprise goals. Additionally, represent-
ing social enterprises presents novel and unstructured issues, provid-
Legal Structures, 6 THE EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 565 (2009) (“Those of us who work with
social enterprises recognize by now that there is no legal definition of social enterprise, and
there is not even a uniformly recognized nonlegal definition, although there have been
many valiant attempts.”); Elizabeth Bibb et al., The Blended Value Glossary, BLENDED
VALUE, 13 (2004), http://www.blendedvalue.org/wp-content/uploads/2004/02/pdf-
blendedvalue-glossary.pdf (“The definition of Social Entrepreneurship is hotly debated.
The definitions in use are often as broad as simultaneously pursuing both financial and
social returns (e.g. double bottom line) or as narrow as non-profits which used earned
income strategies to pursue social objectives. One particular area of debate is whether or
not the definition of social entrepreneurship must include revenue generation or if it just
applies to the application of innovative/entrepreneurial skills to social problems. Finally,
some claim that Social Entrepreneurs are found solely in the non-profit sector but this
narrow definition seems to be waning.”).
14 When describing the type of legal work his students engage in on behalf of double
bottom-line businesses, Praveen Kosuri notes that “the work students perform in these
matters resembles the work they will likely do in practice if they work for private law
firms.” Praveen Kosuri, “Impact” in 3D—Maximizing Impact Through Transactional Clin-
ics, 18 CLIN. L. REV. 1, 40 (2011) [herein Kosuri, “Impact” in 3D]; see also Praveen Kosuri,
Losing My Religion: The Place of Social Justice in Clinical Legal Education, 32 B.C. J. L. &
SOC. JUST. 331, 341 [hereinafter Kosuri, Losing My Religion] (“Most clinicians rightly ac-
knowledge that only a few clinical students will go into public interest careers. As such,
most of them are in clinics to learn transferrable competencies.”).
15 A few major law firms have started practice areas to serve the social enterprise sec-
tor and to serve the “impact” investors that finance social enterprise. See Zachary D. Kauf-
man, Making Social and Environmental Impact Through Legal Careers: The Top 10 Roles
for Attorneys in Social Entrepreneurship (Aug. 2013) (manuscript at 8), available at: http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 2320728.
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ing students with the opportunity to learn the methods and tools
lawyers use to approach, analyze, and solve a legal problem. Moreo-
ver, the social enterprise sector is developing and growing. Law stu-
dents contribute to the sector through direct representation of social
enterprise clients on sophisticated business matters, as well as through
information sharing and knowledge creation of best practices.16
Part I identifies the business models that social enterprises em-
ploy in an effort to provide a robust description of social enterprise,
and an understanding of what students learn through their client rep-
resentation and the SENL Clinic’s curriculum. This description also
illustrates the many ways in which social enterprise has embraced sus-
tainability goals, and how these goals are also visible in the larger cor-
porate sector. Part II argues that the corporate sector is increasingly
focused on sustainability issues, creating a client-driven need to teach
law students about sustainability strategies and practices. Part III ex-
plores how the SENL Clinic engages students in a critical examination
of corporate legal theory as a pedagogical tool to teach law students
corporate law. Students explore whether (and how) corporate law
should be employed to achieve sustainability objectives. Part IV dis-
cusses the skills and practice methods law students enrolled in the
SENL Clinic learn through representing social enterprise clients, such
as information facilitation, knowledge creation, and solving novel and
unstructured legal issues.17 Part V discusses the limitations of selecting
social enterprises as clients in the experiential setting, and offers some
conclusions.
16 “To most public-interest minded law students and lawyers, practicing transactional
law isn’t an obvious path to saving the world.” And yet, transactional lawyers have the
skills and capacity to shape and support sustainability in the corporate sector. JANELLE
ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY: HELPING PEOPLE BUILD COOPERA-
TIVES, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, AND LOCAL SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES 1 (2012); see also Kent
Greenfield, Proposition: Saving the World with Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L. J. 948 (2008).
In his inaugural lecture for the Delaney Family Professorship entitled “Why Would Any-
one Want to be a Public Interest Lawyer?,” Philip Schrag named “corporate reform” in his
list of what constitutes public interest law work. Such work is a large part of the pedagogi-
cal value of representing social enterprises in a transactional law clinic, as is discussed in
this Article. Philip G. Schrag, Why Would Anyone Want to be a Public Interest Lawyer?
Inaugural Lecture of the Delaney Family Professorship, Georgetown Public Law and Legal
Theory Research Paper No. 10-52 (Sept. 2010).
17 Part IV does not reiterate all of the skills and practice methods used in representing
organizational clients. See infra note 142. Rather the focus is on skills learned unique to the
representation of social enterprise clients and the Clinic’s focus on sustainability in the
corporate sector.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYC\20-1\NYC107.txt unknown Seq: 9  8-NOV-13 9:24
Fall 2013] Representing Social Enterprise 223
I. MODELS OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
A. What is Social Enterprise?
In the Clinic seminar, students learn about the various business
models employed by the growing social enterprise sector.18 Students
discover that advocates and actors in the social enterprise sector have
not agreed upon a single definition of “social enterprise” and that
many terms are used to describe the various organizational models on
the value creation spectrum, including social enterprise, triple-bottom
line business19, and social entrepreneurship.20 In seminar sessions that
emphasize business understanding, terminology, and methods, stu-
dents consider the range of possible organizational models and strate-
gies that organizations use to solve environmental and social problems
and/or meet sustainability goals.
Theoretically, organizations that strategically engage in double-
or triple-bottom line value creation, lie on a spectrum between two
extremes.21 On one end of the spectrum are organizations whose mis-
sions and activities are wholly philanthropic. On the other end of the
spectrum are organizations that are profit-maximizing businesses
18 For illustration of the growth of the sector, consider recent legislation promoting new
corporate forms to facilitate the growth of social enterprise that has been passed in several
states with overwhelming bipartisan support. However, it should be noted that social enter-
prise principles can be accomplished in any corporate form whether nonprofit, C-corp, S-
corp or one of the new corporate forms. Social enterprise is not synonymous with social
enterprise legislation. The new corporate forms include the benefit corporation, flexible
purpose corporation, and social purpose corporation along with alternative forms like the
low-profit limited liability and the benefit limited liability company. Nine states have
passed low-profit limited liability company statutes: Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. Twelve states have passed
benefit corporation statutes: California, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia. Fi-
nally, some states have adopted other social enterprise legislation like the flexible purpose
corporation in California, the benefit limited liability company in Maryland, and the social
purpose corporation in Washington. Carter G. Bishop, Fifty State Series: L3C & B Corp
Legislation Table, Suffolk University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Research Paper 10-11 (July 10, 2012); State by State Legislative Status, BENEFITCORP.NET,
http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
19 In business accounting, “bottom line” refers to a financial indicator: revenue minus
expenses (which will either equal a loss or profit). “Triple bottom line” accounting refers to
three dimensions of business performance: social, environmental and financial. In the ver-
nacular, triple bottom line is often called “people, planets, and profit” to denote that finan-
cial performance is not the only meaningful indicator of a business’s success (or failure).
20 See Bibb et al., supra note 13, at 33.
21 J. GREGORY DEES, JED EMERSON & PETER ECONOMY, ENTERPRISING NONPROFITS:
A TOOLKIT FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS 14-15 (2001) (describing the organizational
structure of the social enterprise spectrum as the range between purely philanthropic orga-
nizations and purely commercial organizations); see also Plerhoples, supra note 13, at 228-
32. Often, mainstream media labels all businesses between these two axes as social enter-
prises, not acknowledging that there are crucial distinctions between business models at
different points along this spectrum.
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whose pursuits are solely commercial.22 Closer to the profit-maximiz-
ing side of the social enterprise spectrum, one might find corporate
philanthropy23 or corporate social responsibility24 initiatives. On the
nonprofit side of the spectrum, one might find nonprofit organizations
using an earned income strategy to sustain a set of social services, as
opposed to a nonprofit that relies exclusively on donations.25 Al-
though the work accomplished by social entrepreneurs is not new (Su-
san B. Anthony and John Muir are considered early social
entrepreneurs), the language of social enterprise—the terms used to
classify it—and the current momentum behind the movement has only
recently emerged.
Scholars classify social enterprise business models according to
their activities, operations, and motives.
There are likely hundreds of thousands of organizations that can
and should self-identify as social enterprises in the U.S., on the basis
of “what” they do (i.e. producing a good or service to solve a social
problem), “how” they do it (i.e. employing from, locating in, or buy-
ing from underserved communities as a primary purpose), or “why”
they do it (i.e. making profits principally to reinvest in a social
activity).26
This classification of social enterprise is inclusive. Notably, this defini-
tion does not depend on an entity’s organizational form.27 A social
22 The Blended Value Glossary also has an illustration of a “blended value” spectrum
that labels goals in a hierarchy. At one end are traditional nonprofit organizations that
have a primary mission of achieving some social or environmental impact, and at the other
end are traditional for-profit organizations that have a primary goal of achieving profits for
shareholders. Bibb et al., supra note 13, at 4.
23 One definition of “corporate philanthropy” is “support through gifts, equipment,
supplies, or other contributions by business firms to charitable institutions, sometimes
through organized programs that may include corporate foundations.” Bibb et al., supra
note 13, at 24.
24 “Corporate social responsibility” or CSR can be defined as “the voluntary role of
business in contributing to a better society and a cleaner environment beyond its financial
and capital commitments.” CSR often refers to the strategic social and environmental
value creation initiatives of large, publicly-traded, or widely-held corporations. Bibb et al.,
supra note 13, at 13-14.
25 “Earned income” is “money received by an organization in return for the sale of a
product or rendered service. This does not include corporation or foundation grants, gov-
ernment grants or subsidies, contributions from individuals, or in-kind donation of prod-
ucts or services. Both non-profit and for-profit organizations can have earned income.
However, non-profit earned income strategies are typically designed to cover a social pro-
gram’s cost rather than to be distributed as a profit.” Bibb et al., supra note 13, at 15.
26 Ben Thornley, The Facts of Social Enterprise, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2012, 9:54
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ben-thornley/social-enterprise_b_2090144.html.
27 See also MARC LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN ENTRE-
PRENEURS 7 (2011) (“‘[S]ocial enterprise’ will refer to any business model that, to a signifi-
cant degree, has a mission-driven motive.  This mission-driven motive may be exclusive of
a profit motive or blended with one. The mission-driven motive may be primary and the
profit motive may be secondary, or vice versa.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYC\20-1\NYC107.txt unknown Seq: 11  8-NOV-13 9:24
Fall 2013] Representing Social Enterprise 225
enterprise can be a nonprofit or for-profit entity.28 Some define social
enterprise more narrowly. According to Social Enterprise Alliance,
Inc., a non-profit organization that promotes the goals of social enter-
prise, a social enterprise must “directly address an intractable social
need and serve[ ] the common good, either through its products and
services or through the number of disadvantaged people it em-
ploys.”29 For others, social enterprise means “blended enterprise” or
double or triple bottom line businesses—i.e., “entit[ies] that intend[ ]
to pursue profits and social good both in tandem and by making con-
sidered choices to pursue one over the other.”30
B. How They Do It: The Stakeholder Governance Model
For purpose of this article, social enterprise includes enterprises
that are defined as such because of “how” they operate: they employ
internal governance structures and practices to create social and envi-
ronmental value. Two business models fit this framework, the stake-
holder governance model (or stakeholder relationship management
model)31 and the pluralist ownership model. Both of these models em-
brace a collaborative notion that the corporation’s constituents de-
serve a fair return on their investments, whether those are investments
of capital, labor, natural resources, or land. Advocates of stakeholder
governance reject the notion that “if a company is financially success-
ful then all stakeholders will (automatically and inevitably) benefit.”32
They advocate taking into account returns to other stakeholders
through measurements of both financial and non-financial success,
while acknowledging that the interests of various corporate stakehold-
ers are often divergent and not easily reconciled.33 Some large corpo-
rations, such as Costco and Whole Foods, have implemented
stakeholder governance models to define business performance
28 Thornley, supra note 26 (“35 percent of U.S. social enterprises are non-profit organi-
zations; 31 percent are regular ‘C’ corporations or LLCs.”).
29 What is Social Enterprise?, SOCIAL ENTER. ALLIANCE, https://www.se-alliance.org/
what-is-social-enterprise (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
30 Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L.
REV. 105, 105 (2010).
31 RAJ SISODIA, JAG SHETH & DAVID WOLFE, FIRMS OF ENDEARMENT: HOW WORLD-
CLASS COMPANIES PROFIT FROM PASSION AND PURPOSE (2007) (coining the term “stake-
holder relationship management” business model or SRM and arguing that companies that
take on a stakeholder relationship management business model have a competitive advan-
tage and higher returns to their shareholders).
32 Rory Ridley-Duff, Communitarian Perspectives on Social Enterprise, 15 CORP. GOV-
ERNANCE: INT’L REV. 382, 385 (2007) (parenthetical added).
33 See BEVERLY SCHWARTZ, RIPPLING: HOW SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS SPREAD INNO-
VATION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 77 (2012) (describing social entrepreneurship as
“align[ing] all stakeholder interests by creating mutually beneficially relationships aimed at
serving the community”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYC\20-1\NYC107.txt unknown Seq: 12  8-NOV-13 9:24
226 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:215
through financial, social, and environmental impact.34
Recent state legislation creating new corporate forms such as the
benefit corporation and flexible purpose corporation have embraced
the stakeholder governance model by rejecting maximization of share-
holder wealth as the sole driver of corporate managers’ business deci-
sions.35 In July 2013, Delaware revised its corporate code to adopt the
public benefit corporation, a new for-profit corporate form “intended
to produce a public benefit or public benefits and to operate in a re-
sponsible and sustainable manner.”36 Public benefit corporations are
required to be managed in a manner that balances shareholders’ fi-
34 See SISODIA, SHETH & WOLFE, supra note 31 (profiling Whole Foods, Costco,
Honda, Harley-Davidson, Trader Joe’s, The Container Store, Patagonia, Southwest Air-
lines, Wegmans Food Markets, and New Balance (among other companies) as those who
are employing a stakeholder governance business model); see also John Mackey, The Kind
of Capitalist You Want to Be, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2013, at 34 (Mackey is the co-
founder of Whole Foods, author of Conscious Capitalism, and writes that “business leader-
ship could not be only about maximizing profits for shareholders; it had to deliberately
pursue the many other positive impacts good businesses have on their stakeholders.”).
Contra Kim Fellner, WRESTLING WITH STARBUCKS: CONSCIOUS, CAPITAL, AND CAPPUC-
CINO (2008) (criticizing Starbucks and other “conscious capitalism” companies like Whole
Foods for engaging in “benevolent paternalism” by deciding what is best for their
employees).
35 Opposition to the shareholder wealth maximization norm is named in the legislative
histories of social enterprise legislation as the reasoning motivating such legislation. See,
e.g., W. Derrick Britt et al., Proposed Amendments to the California Corporations Code for
a New Corporate Form: The Flexible Purpose Corporation and Senate Bill 201 — Fre-
quently Asked Questions, BUSINESS FOR GOOD (2011), http://businessforgood.blogspot.
com/2011/03/frequently-asked-questions-proposed.html; see also, Plerhoples, supra note 13
(explaining the legislative history of The Corporate Flexibility Act of 2011 arising from
opposition to the shareholder wealth maximization norm).
36 8 Del. C. §§ 362(a). See also Model Benefit Corporation Legislation with Explanatory
Comments, BENEFIT CORP 10-11 (2012), http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_
Benefit_Corporation_Legislation.pdf. The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation reads:
In discharging the duties of their respective positions and in considering the best
interests of the benefit corporation, the board of directors, committees of the board,
and individual directors of a benefit corporation:
(1) shall consider the effects of any action or inaction upon:
(i) the shareholders of the benefit corporation;
(ii) the employees and work force of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, and
its suppliers;
(iii) the interests of customers as beneficiaries of the general public benefit or
specific public benefit purposes of the benefit corporation;
(iv) community and societal factors, including those of each community in which
offices or facilities of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, or its suppliers are
located;
(v) the local and global environment;
(vi) the short-term and long-term interests of the benefit corporation, including
benefits that may accrue to the benefit corporation from its long-term plans and
the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued indepen-
dence of the benefit corporation; and
(vii) the ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish its general public benefit
purpose and any specific public benefit purpose . . . .
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nancial interests, the best interests of stakeholders materially affected
by the corporation’s conduct, and a public benefit. Notably, corporate
lawyers and businesses that seek access to venture capital, private eq-
uity, and public markets look to Delaware as a corporate law leader
and preferred place of incorporation. California and New York, two
other prominent corporate law jurisdictions, have also adopted stake-
holder governance corporate forms. Both states have adopted the
benefit corporation, and California has also adopted the flexible pur-
pose corporation. The flexible purpose corporate statute in California
requires adoption of  “at least one ‘Special Purpose’ that directors and
managers may consider in addition to traditional shareholder eco-
nomic interests.”37 Additionally, a flexible purpose corporation may
operate for charitable purposes similar to a nonprofit corporation, or
operate for:
[t]he purpose of promoting positive short-term or long-term effects
of, or minimizing adverse short-term or long-term effects of, the
flexible purpose corporation’s activities upon any of the following:
(i) The flexible purpose corporation’s employees, suppliers,
customers, and creditors.
(ii) The community and society.
(iii) The environment.38
The Special Purpose and other purposes must be written into the flex-
ible purpose corporation’s charter and cannot be amended without
two-thirds vote of each class of voting shares.39
Greyston Bakery, the iconic social enterprise that became the
first New York benefit corporation, provides an example of the stake-
holder governance business model. Greyston Bakery dedicates itself
to inner-city community renewal by providing sustainable employ-
ment—including living wages, job training, and benefits—to hard-to-
employ individuals. Net profits from the bakery are distributed to
Greyston Foundation, the bakery’s sole shareholder. The foundation,
in turn, provides job training, affordable housing, youth services,
childcare, and health care to the mixed-income community where it
operates. Greyston Bakery’s motto is, “We don’t hire people to bake
brownies. We bake brownies to hire people.”40 Greyston Bakery is a
37 Britt et al., supra note 35.
38 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(A)-(B) (West 2012).
39 CAL. CORP. CODE § 3000(a)(7)(B) (West 2012).
40 The Greyston Bakery’s Guiding Principles, http://www.greystonbakery.com/wp-con
tent/uploads/pdf/greyston-bakery-guiding-principles.pdf. Another example of social enter-
prise that is defined based on employee low-income or hard-to-employ people is Sseko
Designs, a company that employs university-bound Ugandan women during the nine-
month gap between secondary school and college. Sseko Designs pays the women fair
wages during this gap period and has a mission to end the cycle of poverty of Ugandan
women. During the nine-month employment period, women who work for Sseko Designs
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double-bottom line business that aims to treat its labor and capital in a
sustainable manner. This treatment is at the core of the stakeholder
governance model.41
C. How They Do It: Pluralist Ownership Business Model
A second model of social enterprise that turns on employing in-
ternal governance structures and practices to create a positive social
or environmental impact is the pluralist business model. Advocates
argue that “sustainable social organization evolves out of equitable re-
lationships” where distinctions between capital and labor are not “in-
evitable” and the pluralist ownership model replaces the employer-
employee relationship.42
[T]hese models challenge the prevailing views on who controls the
enterprise and how surplus value should be distributed amongst
stakeholders. They also challenge the reliance [in corporate law] on
‘independent’ directors to make ‘rational’ judgments to protect
shareholder interests and favor internalization of conflicts and
socio-economic thinking guided by corporate debate.43
In the United States, the business models that align most closely with
the pluralist ownership business model are “democratic workplaces,”
the most common of which are employee stock ownership plans
(ESOP) and worker cooperatives. Consider Publix Super Markets, an
employee-owned44 supermarket chain in the southern United States.
Publix Super Markets has more than 1000 stores and had net earnings
of approximately $1.4 billion in 2011. The company’s stock does not
trade on any securities market. Publix common stock is only available
to its current employees (and their beneficiaries) through an ESOP
and the company’s 401(k) Plan.45 Publix stock is owned entirely by its
employees and its non-employee directors. ESOPs operate in compa-
earn enough to fund a year and a half of university tuition and Sseko matches 100% of the
funds the women put aside for tuition. FAQs, SSEKO DESIGNS, http://ssekodesigns.com/
faqs/#charity (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
41 Notably, Greyston Bakery does not claim to be a triple-bottom line business, which
denotes that environmental sustainability is not among the Bakery’s motives.
42 Ridley-Duff, supra note 32, at 383-84, 386 (citing studies that support the idea that
“sustainable companies (and economies) are built slowly by groups of people who collabo-
rate over many years and not through deliberate agency of visionary leaders or charismatic
entrepreneurs.”).
43 Id. (using some United Kingdom companies as examples of companies that have
embraced pluralist business models).
44 Under ESOPs, employees own the stock of the company. Whether those employee-
stockholders can truly be considered “owners” of the company is up for debate. Generally,
stockholders are not considered “owners” of a widely-held corporation. As stockholders,
they only have a residual interest in the firm’s assets. They do not have decision-making
rights over the firm’s day-to-day activities, nor can they unilaterally dissolve the firm.
45 Publix Super Markets, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (2012).
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nies for a variety of reasons: as a source of retirement funds for em-
ployees; to provide employees with a means of participation in
company decisions; to maintain company culture or mission; and to
align employee and management interests.
Although it is unclear whether this pluralist ownership model is
the cause or an effect of Publix’s exceptional corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR) initiatives,46 it is evident that Publix is a mission-driven
company. Publix publishes a Social and Environmental Stewardship
Report each year, highlighting its socially- and environmentally
friendly business operations including those pertaining to recycling
and waste management, resource and water conservation, greenhouse
gas emissions management, sustainably sourced products, salvage
food program, and LEED-certified stores.47  In 2011, Publix ranked
first on the Corporate Social Responsibility Index produced by the
Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship and the Reputation
Institute.48 The CSR Index bases its rankings on the public’s percep-
tion of a company in three areas: “citizenship” (i.e., socially and envi-
ronmentally responsible impact on surrounding community),
“governance” (i.e., fair, transparent, and ethical business practices),
and “workplace” (i.e., fair employee treatment and investment in em-
ployee careers).49
Worker cooperatives fully embrace the pluralist ownership
model, perhaps to an even greater extent than companies with ES-
OPs. The distinguishing characteristics of worker cooperatives are
twofold: “(1) workers invest in and own the business, and (2) decision-
making is democratic, generally adhering to the principle of one
worker, one vote.”50 Governance rights do not depend on equity par-
ticipation in the corporation—each worker has one vote. Worker co-
operatives are situated within a larger community economic
46 There are numerous research reports that have found that ESOPs enhance corporate
and worker performance, and others that find no such effect. See generally, Research on
Employee Ownership, Corporate Performance, and Employee Compensation, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, http://www.nceo.org/articles/research-employee-
ownership-corporate-performance (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
47 PUBLIX SUPER MARKETS, INC., SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP RE-
PORT (2011).
48 Id.; The 2011 Corporate Social Responsibility Index, BOSTON COLL. CTR. FOR COR-
PORATE CITIZENSHIP (2011), available at http://www.bcccc.net/pdf/CSRIReport2011.pdf.
49 BOSTON COLL. CTR. FOR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP, supra note 48. Publix has been
on Fortune’s list of the “100 Best Companies to Work For” since 1998. See PUBLIX SUPER
MARKETS, INC., supra note 47.
50 About Worker Cooperatives, U.S. FED’N OF WORKER COOPS., http://usworker.coop/
aboutworkercoops (last visited Jan. 10, 2013); see also Puget Sound Plywood v. Commis-
sioner, 44 T.C. 305 (1965) (defining cooperatives in a similar manner for tax purposes). For
a thorough legal description of cooperatives, see ORSI, supra note 16, at 181-203.
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development and poverty reduction agenda.51
Equal Exchange, a worker cooperative builds long-term trade
partnerships with sustainable farmers’ cooperatives and distributes
fair trade products such as coffee and tea.52 Equal Exchange has a
“one-worker, one-vote” governance structure with a board elected by
co-op employees, a president who has the same single share as the
other co-op members, and a maximum executive-to-worker compen-
sation of 4-to-1.53 Daniel Fireside, the Capital Coordinator at Equal
Exchange explains the connection between social enterprise and plu-
ralist ownership business models: “for social enterprises to claim the
mantel of being socially responsible, you’ve got to do more than make
a great product or treat your workers with respect. To make profound
changes to the economy, you’ve also got to change the way you think
of ownership, investment, and power.”54
D. Why They Do It: Corporate Philanthropy Business Model
There are some organizations and businesses that bear the social
enterprises moniker because of “why” they operate as they do. These
for-profit social enterprises operate to produce profits that are
donated or reinvested in a socially- or environmentally-beneficial ac-
tivity. Many label this “corporate philanthropy” because the primary
focus is on making profits to fund social or environmental activity.
Greyston Bakery, in part, employs this corporate philanthropy model
in that its sole shareholder is a private foundation. Another prominent
corporate philanthropy model is the “buy-one-give-one” or B1G1
business model. Under the B1G1 model, a for-profit company sells
products or services in a developed nation and donates similar prod-
ucts or services in a developing nation. The social entrepreneurs em-
ploying the B1G1 model seem to be less concerned with transforming
internal corporate governance structures (as the stakeholder govern-
ance model does) and are more focused on the impact that their busi-
nesses have on ameliorating an immediate social, health, or
environmental problem. The most prominent example of the B1G1
model is TOMS Shoes, Inc., a Los Angeles shoe company. For every
pair of TOMS shoes sold at a luxury retail store in developed coun-
51 See, e.g., Gowri J. Krishna, Worker Cooperative Creation as Progressive Lawyering?
Moving Beyond the One-Person, One-Vote Floor, 33 BERKELEY J. OF EMP. & LAB. L. 101
(2013).
52 Equal Exch., Annual Report (2011).
53 Daniel Fireside, Equal Exchange’s Radical Approach to Corporate Social Responsi-
bility, in PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY: HELPING PEOPLE BUILD COOPER-
ATIVES, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, AND LOCAL SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES, supra note 16, at
190-92.
54 Id. at 192.
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tries, the company works with humanitarian organizations to identify
and give a free pair of shoes to a child in a developing countries.55
Other social enterprises that have followed TOMS’ lead include
Warby Parker that donates eyeglasses56 and Baby Teresa which do-
nates baby clothes.57 Consumers in the developed world can now
purchase a wide range of clothes and household goods using the B1G1
model.
E. What They Do: Beneficial Product or Services Business Model
Finally, an inclusive definition of social enterprise also captures
those organizations and businesses whose primary operations are cre-
ating products and services to ameliorate a social or environmental
problem, using a for-profit or nonprofit earned income strategy. Ex-
amples of this type of social enterprise include Soccket, an organiza-
tion that has created a soccer ball that generates and stores electricity
when kicked. The soccer ball is intended to replace kerosene lamps in
developing countries; kerosene lamps cause numerous health and
safety problems, while playing soccer contributes to health by increas-
ing physical activity and teamwork.58 Sanergy, and EcoTact, both so-
cial enterprises, are developing toilets and sanitation systems in urban
slums in Nairobi, and PeePoople, has developed a single-use hygienic
bag that sanitizes wastes and converts it to fertilizer.59 Likewise, the
Center for Inspired Teaching aims to make an impact by providing
“transformative teacher training” to teachers developed through evi-
dence-based research on how students learn.60 The Center for In-
spired Teaching recently opened a public charter school in
Washington, D.C. that demonstrates its pedagogical method and
trains teachers.
55 One for One, TOMS SHOES, http://www.toms.com/our-movement/movement-one-
for-one (last visited Jan. 16, 2013); see also BLAKE MYCOSKIE, START SOMETHING THAT
MATTERS (2011).
56 Buy a Pair, Give a Pair, WARBY PARKER, http://www.warbyparker.com/do-good/
#buy-a-pair-give-a-pair (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
57 About Baby Teresa, Baby Teresa, http://www.baby-teresa.com/pages/about-us (last
visited Jan. 16, 2013).
58 Jim Whitkin, Using Soccer to Supplant Kerosene Use?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2010,
8:32 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/using-soccer-to-supplant-kerosene-
use/.
59 Jonathan Kalan, The Silicon Valley of Shit: Nairobi Is Ground Zero for Sanitation
Innovation, GOOD (Nov. 17, 2011, 2:30 AM), http://www.good.is/posts/the-silicon-valley-
of-shit-nairobi-is-ground-zero-for-sanitation-innovation/.
60 What We Believe About Teaching and Learning, THE CTR. FOR INSPIRED TEACHING,
http://www.inspiredteaching.org/about/our-model/what-we-believe-about-teaching-and-
learning (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (The Center operates a Certificate Program and Insti-
tute to train teachers and has partnered with the District of Columbia and Baltimore public
school districts to improve literacy and mathematics teaching, respectively).
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In sum, the social enterprise sector is vast and dynamic, encom-
passing both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors and a wide range of
industries. Social enterprises use both customary and innovative busi-
ness models to achieve a social and environmental impact and/or meet
sustainability goals. This is the social enterprise sector that law stu-
dents study in the SENL Clinic’s seminar. Students examine these
business models to gain an understanding of business terminology, fi-
nancing methods, and sustainable corporate governance practices.
With some constraints, this is also the sector that law students serve
through their live-client representation.
F. Client Selection
While students in the SENL Clinic study the entire social enter-
prise sector, the Clinic limits its client representation to a subset of
social enterprise clients that meet certain parameters. First, Clinic stu-
dents represent nonprofit organizations (even those that can afford
moderate legal fees) because the primary benefit of the provision of
legal services runs to a charitable class or society as a whole. By repre-
senting a social enterprise that is a nonprofit organization, Clinic stu-
dents are furthering the charitable mission of the nonprofit
organization. Some of the Clinic’s nonprofit clients are social enter-
prises; some are traditional public charities that rely primarily on do-
nations for funding and provide social services to charitable classes.
Whether a social enterprise or not, many of the Clinic’s nonprofit cli-
ents have substantial corporate governance disclosure and reporting
obligations and complex operations similar to public companies, al-
though on a much smaller scale. Nonprofit organizations have boards
of directors with fiduciary duties to the corporation; boards (and
board committees) that have audit, conflict of interest, and
whistleblower responsibilities; operations that require multiple fund-
ing sources; and contractual relationships with employees, suppliers,
vendors, funders, volunteers, and other constituents. In short, this
governance framework and institutional structure introduces students
to a skill set and substantive knowledge of organizational complexity
comparable to what they will employ in corporate or nonprofit law
fields when they graduate.
Second, the SENL Clinic represents for-profit social enterprises.
The Clinic tries not to compete with the local practicing bar. Because
the Clinic’s legal services are provided pro bono and because students
pay tuition to participate in the SENL Clinic, it would be unethical to
devote student resources to the representation of a for-profit business
whose benefit runs primarily to private individuals (as opposed to
low-income individuals, protected class groups, or society as a whole)
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if that business can afford to pay for legal services. Nonetheless, the
SENL Clinic represents for-profit social enterprises that are engaged
in an activity whose primary mission is to have a beneficial social and/
or environmental impact on disadvantaged individuals or communi-
ties, similar to a nonprofit organization. Some such for-profit clients
cannot afford to pay legal fees; a few can afford to pay moderate legal
fees but the Clinic represents them pro bono as well. Representing
select for-profit clients that can afford moderate legal fees carries with
it a similar justification as representing nonprofit organizations that
can afford to pay legal fees: representing social enterprises whose pri-
mary mission is charitable helps further that mission.
The SENL Clinic also represents for-profit social enterprises that
cannot afford to pay legal fees61 even where the primary mission is not
a charitable mission. An example is an educational cooperative that
operates under a for-profit pluralist ownership model—moderate-in-
come teachers jointly own the cooperative and provide English as a
second language training. The cooperative does not have a primary
mission to benefit disadvantaged individuals or communities and ben-
efits run primarily to the teacher-owners. Nonetheless, the coopera-
tive has a social enterprise characteristic—the pluralist ownership
model—that Clinic students can learn about through the client repre-
sentation. Furthermore, the representation aids in community eco-
nomic development by facilitating the financial independence for the
group of teacher-owners.62 Given the high price of legal services, and
the fact that law firms often have blanket policies prohibiting pro
bono legal services to any for-profit entity, it is probable that the co-
operative would not be able to find affordable representation for its
legal needs. In selecting this social enterprise client, Clinic students
are able to both learn about the pluralist ownership business model as
well as assist a small business that would otherwise attempt to handle
its legal needs by itself or through non-lawyers.
The foregoing description of social enterprise and the Clinic’s se-
lection criteria is only part of the story.63 The more important ques-
61 For-profit social enterprises that cannot afford to pay legal fees are typically
“microenterprises.” The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development defines
microenterprises as a commercial enterprise that has five or fewer employees, one or more
whom owns the enterprise. Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L.
102-550, 106 Stat. 3672, tit. 7, § 807 (c)(2) (1992).
62 For additional arguments in favor of providing pro bono legal services to for-profit
business, see James L. Baillie, Fulfilling the Promise of Business Law Pro Bono, 28 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1543 (2002).
63 An additional important issue concerns the teaching of transactional lawyering in
law school. Traditionally, law schools have relied on the Langdellian method of teaching,
where students learn legal analysis and law by reading cases. Law students learns contract
law or business associations by reading cases where a contract is in dispute, an agent ex-
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tions are: why represent primarily social enterprise clients and why
build a curriculum around the social enterprise sector? According to a
2010-2011 study by the Center for the Study of Applied Legal Educa-
tion, approximately 52 law schools in the United States have transac-
tional law clinics that practice community economic development law,
intellectual property law, housing law, consumer law, and nonprofit
law.64 Many transactional law clinics use client selection criteria simi-
lar to that of the SENL Clinic, and many represent social enter-
prises.65 A key feature of the SENL Clinic is the development of a
curriculum that explicitly focuses on the social enterprise sector and
its relation to sustainable corporate strategies and practices to prepare
students for transactional practice where future corporate and non-
profit clients will demand such knowledge and skills.
II. PREPARING FOR CORPORATE PRACTICE
Representing social enterprise clients helps prepare students for a
corporate practice where business clients are facing greater demands
to be “sustainable” in their business operations. In 1983, the United
ceeds its authority, or a board violates its duties to the corporation. Although the Langdel-
lian method succeeds in teaching law and legal reasoning and analysis, it does so through
the lens of appellate cases. The typical first year curriculum of most law schools is entirely
based on a litigation framework, with many upper-level law courses using a similar lens.
Law school does not introduce or teach law students about corporate documents, contrac-
tual documents, or transactional practice methods unless through their own initiative or by
enrolling in specialized courses. Due in part to this reason, law schools have received sub-
stantial criticism from practicing corporate attorneys and law firms for failing to produce
law graduates ready to practice in transactional law areas such as corporate governance,
corporate finance, project finance, real estate law, intellectual property, and tax. Repre-
senting organizational clients on corporate and transactional matters is a partial attempt to
fill this transactional void.  See Lisa Penland, What a Transactional Lawyer Needs to Know:
Identifying and Implementing Competencies for Transactional Lawyers, 5 J. OF THE ASS’N
OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 118, 119 (2008); Celeste M. Hammond, Borrowing from
the B Schools: The Legal Case Study as Course Materials for Transaction Oriented Elective
Courses: A Response to the Challenges of the MacCrate Report and the Carnegie Founda-
tion for Advancement of Teaching Report on Legal Education, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J.
BUS. L. 9, 10 (2009); Seth Freeman, Bridging the Gaps: How Cross-Disciplinary Training
with MBAs Can Improve Transactional Education, Prepare Students for Private Practice,
and Enhance University Life, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 93 (2008); Eric J.
Gouvin, Teaching Business Lawyering in Law school: A Candid Assessment of the Chal-
lenges and Some Suggestions for Moving Ahead. 78 UMKC L. REV 429, 429-30, 441-42
(2009).
64 Survey from The Center for the Study of Applied Legal Education, 2010-2011 Sur-
vey Subset on Transactional Law Clinics (May 11, 2012) (on file with author).
65 For example, I regularly collaborate with the directors of the International Transac-
tions Clinic at the University of Michigan Law School and the Small Business & Commu-
nity Economic Development Clinic at The George Washington University Law School,
both of which represent social enterprises. See Deborah Burand, Susan R. Jones, & Alicia
E. Plerhoples, Clinic Collaborations: Going Global to Advance Social Entrepreneurship
(manuscript on file with author).
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Nations tasked the World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment (also known as the “Brundtland Commission” after its chair-
man, Gro Harlem Brundtland) with recommending long-term
strategies for sustainable global development.66 In its report, the
Brundtland Commission defined sustainable development as the abil-
ity of an organization, community, or other group to “meet the needs
of the present generation without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.”67 Sustainability is an interdisci-
plinary, multi-faceted, complex goal.68 Benchmarks for sustainability
are not easily defined69 or measured.70 And questions loom around
how to attract and satisfy equity investors in a firm that does not pri-
oritize shareholder returns over other stakeholders or charitable
objectives.71
66 Our Common Future, World Comm. on the Env’t and Dev. Rep., U.N. Doc. A/42/
427 (1987) [hereinafter Our Common Future].
67 Id. at 8; see also Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a
New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987 (2009) (defining sus-
tainability in the context of corporate governance and advocating for businesses to volun-
tarily commit to sustainable business practices).
68 See, e.g., Matthias Ruth, A Quest for the Economics of Sustainability and the Sus-
tainability of Economics, 56 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 332, 335 (2006) (“Environmental issues
are complex and to understand them requires interdisciplinary approaches.”).
69 Economists Stefan Baumgartner and Martin Quaas describe sustainability as having
its roots in normative views of justice vis-a`-vis three relationships: (i) intergenerational
justice between present and future generations; (ii) intragenerational justice between dif-
ferent groups of the same generation; and (iii) justice between humans and the planet.
Stefan Baumgartner & Martin Quaas, What is Sustainability Economics?, 69 ECOLOGICAL
ECON. 445, 445 (2010) (describing sustainability as “a normative notion about the way
humans should act towards nature, and how they are responsible towards one another and
future generations” and acknowledging the difficulty of defining and measuring sus-
tainability as it pertains to justice). Some corporate managers and third party analysts en-
gaged in sustainability efforts in the corporate sector define sustainability as the strategic
pursuit of blended or shared value—i.e., positive social, environmental, and financial value
creation. The term “blended value” was coined by Jed Emerson. See ANTONY BUGG-LE-
VINE & JED EMERSON, IMPACT INVESTING: TRANSFORMING HOW WE MAKE MONEY
WHILE MAKING A DIFFERENCE 10-11 (2011)
70 All firms have the capacity to create and destroy social, environmental, and financial
value to varying degrees and the three value sets are necessarily intertwined and often
indivisible. See ANTONY BUGG-LEVINE & JED EMERSON, supra note 69 (“All organiza-
tions, for-profit and nonprofit alike, create value that consists of economic, social, and
environmental components. All investors, whether market rate, charitable, or some mix of
the two, generate all three forms of value. But somehow this fundamental trust has been
lost to a world that sees value as being only economic (created by for-profit companies) or
social (created by nonprofit organizations or government). And most business managers,
as well as investors, miss out on the opportunity to capture their total value potential by
not managing for blended value on an intentional strategic basis.”). See also Elkington,
supra note 4, at 523-24 (Elkington, the originator of the term “triple bottom line,” states
that “[t]he TBL concept basically expresses the fact that companies and other organiza-
tions create value in multiple dimensions. In this case, we are talking about economic,
social, and environmental value added – or destroyed.”).
71 See, e.g., Antony Bugg-Levine, Bruce Kogut, and Nalin Kulatilaka, A New Approach
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The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), a non-
profit organization recently formed to create industry-specific sus-
tainability accounting standards as a parallel to the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), defines “sustainability perform-
ance” with respect to the corporate sector:
[S]ustainability performance encompasses environmental, social,
and governance factors that have the potential to affect long term
value creation and/or the public interest.  We believe that compa-
nies need to be cognizant of the environmental and social impacts of
their activities, the systems that govern and guide policies and ac-
tions, and the underlying environmental and social capital upon
which value creation can be sustained. We also believe that inves-
tors and the public deserve to be informed of these impacts. A sus-
tainable company is accountable for the social and environmental
impacts of its commercial endeavors and continually adapts to man-
age business risks and seize opportunities while creating long term
value by meeting society’s needs.72
Third party standards firms like SASB, Global Reporting Initiative, B
Lab, and GIIRS Ratings & Analytics for Impact Investing73 have de-
veloped or are in the process of developing metrics to measure sus-
tainability on a company-by-company or sector-by-sector basis with
little convergence yet.74 Sustainability accounting and reporting is still
to Funding Social Enterprises, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2012, at 4 (“[M]any, if not most,
social enterprises cannot fund themselves entirely through sales or investment. They are
not profitable enough to access traditional financial markets, resulting in a financial-social
return gap. The social value of providing poor people with affordable health care, basic
foodstuffs, or safe cleaning products is enormous, but the cost of private funding often
outweighs the monetary return. Many social enterprises survive only through the largesse
of government subsidies, charitable foundations, and a handful of high-net-worth individu-
als who will make donations or accept lower financial returns on their investments in social
projects.”)
72 What is “Sustainability”?, SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, http://
www.sasb.org/approach/sustainability/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2013). Similarly, the Interna-
tional Federation of Accountants defines “sustainable success” as the combination of eco-
nomic, environmental, and social performance of an organization that determines overall
stakeholder value and allows the organization to succeed and prosper in the long term . . . .
[S]hareholders and other stakeholders should take more interest in the longer-term per-
spectives of the organization, including holding the board and leadership accountable for
overall sustainable performance, not just short-term financial results.” International Feder-
ation of Accountants, Integrating Governance for Sustainable Success, at 6 (2012), available
at http://www.ifac.org/publications-resources/integrating-governance-sustainable-success
(hereinafter IFAC).
73 About GRI, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting.org/infor
mation/about-gri/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2013); The Nonprofit Behind B
Corps, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-
corps (last visited Sept. 9, 2013); How GIIRS Works, GIIRS RATINGS & ANALYTICS FOR
IMPACT INVESTING, http://giirs.org/about-giirs/how-giirs-works (last visited Sept. 9, 2013).
74 Matteo Tonello, Reporting on Corporate Sustainability Performance, HARV. L. SCH.
FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 6, 2012, 8:58 AM), http://blogs.law.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYC\20-1\NYC107.txt unknown Seq: 23  8-NOV-13 9:24
Fall 2013] Representing Social Enterprise 237
voluntary for most businesses but may emerge soon as a “best prac-
tice” for companies. Funding for third party standards firms often
comes from companies themselves as corporate boards and managers
are motivated by the need to make their operations more sustainable
or, at least, to exert influence on the process of defining sustainability
metrics.
The UN Global Compact–Accenture CEO Study in 2010 con-
ducted more than 100 interviews with CEOs, chairpersons, and presi-
dents, and surveyed 766 CEOs of companies that are members of the
UN Global Compact, a corporate citizenship and sustainability initia-
tive. This study—the largest study of CEOs ever conducted with re-
spect to the issue of sustainability—reports that:
CEOs around the world are starting to see the shape of a new era of
sustainability coming into view. In the face of rising global competi-
tion, technological change and the most serious economic downturn
in nearly a century, corporate commitment to the principles of sus-
tainability remains strong throughout the world: 93 percent of
CEOs see sustainability as important to their company’s future
success.75
The study notes that this is “a fundamental shift since the last Global
Compact survey in 2007. At the time of the earlier study, sustainability
was just emerging on the periphery of business issues . . . . Three years
later, sustainability is truly top-of-mind for CEOs around the
world.”76 Corporate managers also view sustainability in a holistic
fashion—it is not a discrete issue that they can handle through a one-
off initiative or lone team member. The CEOs surveyed acknowl-
edged that sustainability must be “something fully integrated into the
harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/12/06/reporting-on-corporate-sustainability-performance/
(presenting an analysis of sustainability indicators: “Clearly, there is incredible diversity in
the indicators disclosed. A number of factors may have contributed to this diversity, in-
cluding differing interpretations of sustainability, a relative lack of mandatory standards
for reporting, the fact that different sectors have different reporting priorities, and the
need to accommodate local circumstances. Sustainability reporting is still relatively new to
many corporations, which may further contribute to the uncertainty about what to dis-
close.”); see also John Elkington & Pamela Hartigan, THE POWER OF UNREASONABLE
PEOPLE: HOW SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS CREATE MARKETS THAT CHANGE THE WORD,
183-84 (2008) (“[T]o promote scalability for social and environmental ventures and their
partnerships with mainstream businesses, we need a number of ingredients . . . . [O]ne of
the most critical missing links is a universally-accepted accounting language that would
assess the extent to which all enterprises—whatever their scale—were heading toward
sustainability.”).
75 U.N. & Global Impact, A New Era of Sustainability: UN Global Compact – Accen-
ture CEO Study 10 (2010) [hereinafter Accenture CEO Study]. Members of the UN
Global Compact include leading global public companies like Bristol-Myers Squib, Owens
Corning, Merck & Co., General Electric Company, PepsiCo Inc., General Mills, Ford Mo-
tor Company, The Dow Chemical Company, DuPont, Cisco Systems, and Nike, Inc.
76 Id.
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strategy and operations of a company.”77 “[S]ustainable business prac-
tices and products are opening up new markets and sources of de-
mand; driving new business models and sources of innovation;
changing industry cost structures; and beginning to permeate business
from corporate strategy to all elements of operation.”78
What motivating factors are driving corporate managers concern
with sustainability? The corporate sector is responding to a rapidly
changing world that is undergoing “radical disruption—of markets,
societies and ecosystems” caused by climate change, growing inequal-
ity, and increased global competition for natural resources.79 A full
exploration of these challenges is beyond the scope of this article.
However, these challenges affect the financial viability of corpora-
tions. For example, severe weather caused by climate change will in-
crease insurance and production costs, and may physically disrupt
supply chains; economic inequality reduces the pool of consumers
able to purchase a corporation’s goods and services, and can create
civil and political unrest that targets corporations; and increased
global competition for natural resources impacts the availability, and
increases the prices, of important factors of production. Moreover,
consumers increasingly care about the social and environmental ef-
fects of companies and are using their purchasing power to demand
more socially- and environmentally-responsible corporate behavior.
Finally, market activity has increasingly become concentrated in fewer
corporations, “which has led to a larger social and environmental im-
pact from the activities of a few corporations that can be more easily
located and held accountable by an increasingly activist civil
society.”80
This is the new corporate sector for which law students must be
77 Id. at 11.
78 Id. at 10.
79 Elkington, supra note 4, at 525 (noting that the 2006 World Economic Forum focused
on many of these issues in its study Global Risks 2006); see also Elkington & Hartigan,
supra note 74 (noting that the “CIA has predicated that environmental pressures will exac-
erbate global tensions and increase the risk of conflict in the coming decade.”); WWF &
SustainAbility, One Planet Business: Creating Value Within Planetary Limits (2007) (re-
porting that, since the 1980s human consumption has exceeded natural resource supply by
over 20%); TRACEY S. KEYS & THOMAS W. MALNIGHT, THE GLOBAL TRENDS REPORT
2013: TOWARDS A DISTRIBUTED FUTURE, 128 (2013) (reporting that in the near future
corporations must contend with strained resources caused by population growth, inequal-
ity, climate change, and environmental challenges, and that organizations must collaborate
and “shift mindsets to support sustainable resource goals”); Joseph Stiglitz, Inequality is
Holding Back the Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2013, at SR1 (noting that inequality is
holding back economic growth and is contributing to political inequality).
80 George Serafeim, The Role of the Corporation in Society: An Alternative View and
Opportunities for Future Research 2 (May 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2270579 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2270579.
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prepared. Law students who want to practice business law must be
prepared for a shifting business and consumer culture where sus-
tainability plays a central role, whether for financial or altruistic rea-
sons. Despite much agreement that sustainability is a top priority,
there is still a great deal of work to be done with respect to execution,
implementation, and measurement. Educational institutions can be
particularly helpful in introducing students to both corporate sus-
tainability efforts and social enterprise and giving them the skills and
support they need to be the next generation of corporate lawyers with
tools to facilitate clients’ sustainability needs.81 Lawyers have an im-
portant role to play in facilitating sustainability governance practices,
programs, policies, and regulation.82 The SENL Clinic introduces law
students to corporate sustainability through representation of small-
scale sustainability and charitable objectives that social enterprises
pursue. In this way, Clinic students become “changemakers”—i.e.,
“those who work with social entrepreneurs and help them spread their
innovations and impact to other places, people, and sectors.”83
For example, students may represent a start-up social enterprise
that produces goods to raise awareness of a social problem and uses
profits from the goods sold to address the problem. The client seeks
help from the Clinic to ensure that its manufacturer and supplier do
not harm or dilute the business’s brand or social mission by, for exam-
ple, using child labor, engaging in harmful labor practices, or infring-
ing on the brand’s trademarks. For any company, these are important
legal and business risks to be mitigated. For a start-up social enter-
prise that is building its customer base from conscious consumers and
offers brand value based on “doing good,” these risks are paramount.
For this client, SENL Clinic students research possible steps that the
client can take to maintain transparency in its supply chain and pro-
81 Elkington & Hartigan, supra note 74, at 206 (“Educational institutions are vital for
the long-term success of communities, countries, and the global economy . . . [they] can
teach the skills that propel world-class entrepreneurs. They therefore need to cultivate
entrepreneurial thinking, promote interdisciplinary programs, provide internships and
other opportunities to expose young people to the world of entrepreneurship, stimulate the
formation of national and global networks, contribute research to the field, and support
young entrepreneurs with awards.”).
82  Id. at 11-12. Although many business leaders agree that sustainability is a top prior-
ity and have begun to address sustainability issues, execution and integration of sus-
tainability practices into their strategy and operations remains a major challenge to
implementing a new sustainability paradigm. Companies face three major external chal-
lenges in implementing and executing sustainability strategies and operations: investors,
consumers, and the regulatory environment. Investors are not yet seen as supportive of
sustainability efforts; it is as yet unclear that consumers make purchasing decisions based
on sustainability issues, and future regulation around key components of sustainability ini-
tiatives is uncertain.
83 SCHWARTZ, supra note 33, at 7.
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tect the business’s intellectual property. The students then draft ap-
propriate contracts and corporate policies with specific provisions
pertaining to the client’s social mission and that will meet the client’s
goals. The students also identify options—such as third party certifica-
tion or assessment of social objectives—that the client might consider
adopting voluntarily to meet its goals.
III. EXAMINING (SUSTAINABLE) CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Representing social enterprises is the catalyst for in-depth semi-
nar discussion of corporate law and its underlying theories. Clinical
legal education has a distinctive pedagogy that includes teaching stu-
dents to learn from practice and from their own experiences.84 Clinical
pedagogy “comprises theorizing and reflection about lawyering in-
cluding issues such as socio-economic influences on available solutions
to problems, ethical and moral dilemmas, and service delivery.”85 An
important feature of this pedagogy is to show students, through super-
vised practice and seminar discussion, that the law is not viewpoint-
neutral or value-free but created and advanced by normative values
and arguments.86 Thus, one of the mechanisms to meet the goal of
preparing students for corporate sustainability practice is to engage
students in an examination of various corporate laws as well as the
legal theories upon which current state corporate law rests, as they
relate to sustainability.87 Representing social enterprises complements
this theoretical study, as students are able to bring their practical ex-
periences with clients into the classroom.
Through reading for the Clinic seminar, students examine two
84 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PRO-
FESSION OF LAW 121 (2007) (“Assuming responsibilities for outcomes that affect clients
with whom the student has established a relationship enables the learner to go beyond
concepts, to actually become a professional in practice.”); see also Kenneth R. Kreiling,
Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning to Learn from Expe-
rience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 279 (1981)
(“[C]linical legal education is primarily concerned with the process of learning from actual
experience, learning through taking action (or observing someone else taking action) and
then analyzing the effects of the action.”).
85 Kosuri, “Impact” in 3D, supra note 8, at 18-19.
86 Critical legal studies, in part, share the same task as clinical legal education. Critical
legal theory challenges assumptions that the law is value free and instead makes inquiries
into the norms that legitimize injustice and maintain inequality. See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb,
Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal Theory, 43 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 717, 722 (1992) (describing the relationship of clinical legal education to critical
legal studies as “both work(ing) to make conscious the tactic theories that the legal system
embodies and expresses.”).
87 See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSI-
NESS ORGANIZATION 8 (3d ed. 2009) (“In business law, the lawyer who fails to understand
the economics of a problem usually fails to find a satisfactory solution to the problem.”).
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prominent competing theories of corporate law: contractarian and
communitarian theories, and their relation to various business models
and organizational activities that contribute to or detract from sus-
tainability.88 The readings and seminar discussion make explicit these
theories’ underlying norms and values in order for the student to learn
that corporate law is not objective and immutable, but subjective and
challengeable. And that corporate law, like all law, can be decon-
structed “to illuminate the assumptions, biases, values, and norms em-
bedded in law’s workings in order to heighten awareness of the
political and moral choices made by lawyers and the legal system.”89
Far from being abstract, these corporate law theories are central to the
story of the purpose of the corporation: is the corporation’s most effi-
cient and effective use to create shareholder wealth, or to contribute
to social well being at large? These theories—contractarian and com-
munitarian—and their deductions about corporate purpose, influence
the mindset and behavior of corporate actors and the laws promul-
gated by legislators and corporate regulators. For example, a corpo-
rate actor who believes that the law requires the corporation to
maximize shareholder wealth may behave differently than a corporate
actor who knows that the shareholder wealth maximization norm is
much more nuanced.
Class discussion of the shareholder wealth maximization norm,
and contractarian and communitarian legal theories enhances stu-
dents’ learning experience through the intersection of legal theory and
legal practice. The examination of corporate legal theory in the semi-
nar complements a student’s client work by placing discrete client is-
sues within a larger theoretical framework about corporate
sustainability.90 I describe each of these theories below very briefly.
The purpose here is to not to fully explore or reiterate the various
points and counterpoints of each theory but to illustrate how these
theories help students’ understanding of corporate governance and its
relation to sustainability practices.
88 Notably there are other corporate law theories that relate to corporate sustainability
(such as concession theory and sovereign coercion theory) that students explore in the
Clinic seminar. However, there are numerous constraints on students’ time (including ac-
tual representation of clients) that often do not allow for full exploration of all competing
corporate law theories relating to corporate sustainability. Commitments to practice must
be balanced along with theoretical engagement in the Clinic.
89 Goldfarb, supra note 86.
90 See id. at 721 (“Clinical legal education, with one foot in academia and the other in
the practice of law, represents an ideal vantage point from which to scrutinize conventional
lawyers’ practices and bring the theories that prefigure them into conscious awareness . . . .
In the hands of clinical educators, experience can generate theory which can circle back to
inform experience, which in turn can alter, refine, and improve the theory.”).
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A. The Corporation as a “Nexus of Contracts”
Dominant modern corporate law theory describes a corporation
as a “nexus of contracts”.91 Under this widely-accepted theory, the
corporation is a nexus of a set of contracts among the firm’s constitu-
ents which include its shareholders, as providers of capital, but also its
employees, creditors, suppliers, and board of directors.92 Efficiency is
the basis for this corporate law theory, and rational individuals acting
in their own self-interest promotes such efficiency.93 Each constituent
implicitly or explicitly enters into a voluntary contract with the corpo-
ration—employees enter into employment agreements while the
firm’s contract with its shareholders is set forth in the firm’s organiza-
tional documents and the corporate laws (common law and statute) of
the firm’s state of incorporation.94 State corporate governance laws,
then, act as a default set of rules (i.e., rules that the parties to the
contract would have entered into absent government regulation) that
reduce agency costs and facilitate private ordering95 between the firm
and the firm’s shareholders. State corporate laws thus reflect the rules
that shareholders would contract for—corporate directors are bound
by fiduciary duty to serve the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders. The “best interest of the corporation” is taken, by many,
to mean shareholder wealth maximization.96 Corporate laws and
“shareholder friendly” governance structures and business practices
are created and counseled as “best practices” to align manager/agent
91 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).
92 Id; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate
Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 777 (2006).
93 WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 87, at 7 (“We have argued that judges and
lawyers, as well as academic commentators, ought to use efficiency in the production of
wealth as the principle standard for evaluating current law.”).
94 David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1378 (1993).
95 Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 1428; see also Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority
Voting Rules in Corporate America: Majority Rule, Corporate Legitimacy, and Minority
Shareholder Protection, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 895, 916-17 (1996) (describing corporate law as
“enabling legislation . . . subject to bargaining and revision by the contracting parties them-
selves”); WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 87, at 12-13 (“[The corporate] form suc-
ceeds because it reduces the transactions costs of complex economic contracting. But the
corporate form does so at the risk of creating agency problems that must be constrained if
it is to succeed. Thus, a principal aim of corporation law is the reduction of agency costs of
all sorts.”).
96 See discussion of shareholder wealth maximization norm in Plerhoples, supra note
13; see also ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 2265 (“[T]he ‘best inter-
ests of the corporation’ are equated with ‘corporate profit and shareholder gain’”); Bain-
bridge, supra note 1, at 1423 (justifying the shareholder wealth maximization norm and
espousing it as a central tenet under Delaware law).
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decision-making with shareholder/principal goals.97
In this way, corporate governance law is the subject of private
law, insulated from public law as well as the collective public
interest.98
In the view of contractarians, if social activists want to reform the
activities of corporations, they must seek redress through the politi-
cal process, and their options are limited to public law options, not
rules of corporate governance.99
B. The Corporation as an “Externalizing Machine”100
Communitarians view contractarian theory as taking too narrow
a view of the corporation. Communitarians emphasize the harm done
to nonshareholder constituents as corporations pursue shareholder
value. Kent Greenfield observes that “one of the intractable problems
is the nature of the corporation to produce externalities.”101 Green-
field notes that this is not a statement about the morality or ethics of
corporations but an economic reality.102
The nature of the firm is to create financial wealth by producing
goods and services for profit; without regulator or contractual limits,
the firm has every incentive to externalize costs onto those whose
interests are not included in the firm’s current financial calculus.103
Communitarians provide routine business operations as examples of
the externalities corporations create—e.g., payment of non-livable
wages that require employees to seek government or charitable assis-
tance,104 or the social and economic costs of a plant closing on a local
97 The Jensen and Meckling academic article provided a foundation for the shareholder
wealth maximization norm and framed the principal-agent problem as the central chal-
lenge of corporate governance. That is, who will constrain the agent/corporate manager’s
behavior? Choosing the shareholder as the primary principal has been the historically
dominant choice. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 91; see also STOUT, supra note 2, at 33, 47,
52 (stating that although shareholder wealth maximization is not required by corporate
law, many legal scholars espouse it as a normative goal, corporate law allows companies to
adopt the goal of shareholder wealth maximization, and public companies have embraced
shareholder wealth maximization to a great extent more than they used to).
98 KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 17 (2006) (challenging enablingism in corporate law).
99 Id. at 31; see also Millon, supra note 94, at 1378. Contra Ronald Daniels, Stakehold-
ers and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism Be Compassionate?, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 315
(1993) (arguing that contractarian theory has room for nonshareholder protection
arguments).
100 MITCHELL, supra note 2, at 53 (“The function perfected by limited liability is that of
permitting corporations to externalize the costs of stock price maximization, that is, to
push those costs onto others. The corporation is the perfect ‘externalizing machine.’”).
101 Greenfield, supra note 2, at 627.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea Getting Worse,
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community. Environmental examples abound as well. For example,
Apple, Google, Facebook, Amazon, and other online companies
waste a staggering level of energy in the operation of their computer
servers. According to an investigation by the New York Times, the
data centers of online companies “can waste 90 percent or more of the
electricity they pull off the grid.” This energy waste is significant,
given that “worldwide, the digital warehouses use about 30 billion
watts of electricity, roughly equivalent to the output of 30 nuclear
power plants.”105 Communitarians are skeptical of the ability of con-
tract-based, private law approach to reduce such externalities. A con-
tract-based approach assumes that nonshareholder constituents have
the bargaining power to protect themselves, or can predict the future
harm to be inflicted to protect themselves ex ante.106 Communitarians
often promote government regulation and laws to protect non-
shareholder stakeholders’ interests in ways that a contract-based ap-
proach cannot.
C. Exposing Normative Values
Contractarian and communitarian theories carry with them dis-
tinct normative views of the world.107 Here, there is the risk of over-
simplifying each group’s views; I do not mean to suggest a lack of
diverging values within any one group. Nonetheless, these normative
values are stated in their most general and accepted terms to illustrate
how students are challenged to think critically about corporate gov-
ernance theories and their impact on corporate law and their social
enterprise clients. Just as a student in a community economic develop-
ment clinic might examine the normative values and arguments that
perpetuate poverty and inequality in a low-income neighborhood, or a
58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1107, 1112, n. 24 (2008) (“If there are net social benefits to
cushioning employees from such harm (i.e., firing employees or reducing wages) the cost of
such cushioning should be borne socially—i.e., by the government—rather than by
shareholders.”).
105 James Glanz, Power, Pollution, and the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/09/23/technology/data-centers-waste-vast-amounts-of-energy-bely-
ing-industry-image.html (“A yearlong examination by The New York Times has revealed
that this foundation of the information industry is sharply at odds with its image of sleek
efficiency and environmental friendliness. Most data centers, by design, consume vast
amounts of energy in an incongruously wasteful manner, interviews and documents show.
Online companies typically run their facilities at maximum capacity around the clock,
whatever the demand. As a result, data centers can waste 90 percent or more of the elec-
tricity they pull off the grid, The Times found.”).
106 Millon, supra note 94, at 1379 (“Particular kinds of harmful conduct may be difficult
for nonshareholders to foresee and specify adequately, because of management’s informa-
tional advantages and also because of the endless change and innovation in corporate ac-
tivity that a market economy demands.”).
107 Millon, supra note 94, at 1382.
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student in an immigration clinic might examine the normative bases
for the DREAM Act or immigration laws, a student in the SENL
Clinic unpacks corporate law.
1. Unpacking Contractarian Theory
Efficiency arguments are at the heart of contractarian theory.108
One such efficiency argument contractarian theorists rely on is that
“rational individuals do not strike bargains with one another unless
each perceives it to be in his or her own interest to do so.”109 This
exercise of liberty by rational individuals promotes efficiency. Choos-
ing efficiency as the “dominant, if not the sole, criterion for academic
evaluation of corporate law doctrines”110 is a value-based choice. Cor-
porate law casebooks often obviate this choice, suggesting to students
that efficiency as the sole foundation of corporate law is unquestiona-
ble. Consider, for example, the following excerpt from the first chap-
ter of a leading corporate law casebook:
As citizens, of course, we are concerned about far more than the
creation of total wealth or even our share of it . . . . But by and
large, corporation law has been shaped within the classical liberal
political paradigm as a field limited to only a slice of the human
experience. Thus, legitimate political questions about, for example,
the social distribution of wealth fall outside the competence of cor-
porate law. The laws of taxation, education, environmental and la-
bor policy, product safety, and other issues of health, safety, and
welfare address the distribution of risks and rewards in society. Cor-
porate law addresses the creation of economic wealth through the
facilitation of voluntary, ongoing collective action.111
The authors of this text have framed corporate law in a manner that
obstructs law students’ exploration of alternative theories based on
different normative values. The authors of this text go on to state that
“corporate law in particular deals with the creation and governance of
the private legal entities that are the principle economic actors in the
modern world. Thus, it deals with the control over vast aggregations
108 WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 87, at 2 (“Efficiency is the dominant, if not the
sole, criterion for academic evaluation of corporate law doctrines.”). Both Pareto stan-
dards and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency are used to advance contractarian theory. See Jules
Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, in MARKETS, MORALS AND THE
LAW 95 (1988) (describing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and Pareto-optimal distributions with
respect to their normative basis in utilitarianism, libertarianism, and contractarianism).
109 JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 101 (1988); see Ige Omotayo
Bolodeoku, Contractarianism and Corporate Law: Alternative Explanations to the Law’s
Mandatory and Enabling/Default Contents, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 433, 452
(2005).
110 WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 87, at 2.
111 Id. at 2-3.
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of wealth and power.”112 A laissez-faire approach to “vast aggrega-
tions of wealth and power” is an approach to which many object. If a
law student is exposed to just this text in her course on corporate law,
she will have gained no exposure to other potentially legitimate cor-
porate law theories. As one communitarian author notes, “con-
tractarians . . . push a political vision. They simply do not bother to
speak about it in those terms. If they do, they will encounter many of
the same kinds of challenges now confronting communitarians.”113
There are also many challenges to the notion that a corporation’s
purpose is to maximize shareholder value. Lynn Stout criticizes
“shareholder value thinking” by noting that there is no reliable empir-
ical evidence as to whether the approach actually improves corporate
performance.114 Others criticize shareholder wealth maximization as
contributing to corporate short-termism on the part of corporate man-
agers, leading to financial crises such as the 2008 financial crisis after
financial industries were deregulated in pursuit of shareholder
wealth.115
A major critique of contractarian theory arises from its basis in
property rights: “[W]hen corporate law scholars argue for legal rules
that say that stakeholders must protect themselves through their con-
tractual rights, that is simply another way of saying that they get only
those rights they can buy.”116 This is not to say that contractarians are
not concerned with economic inequality and other societal and envi-
ronmental problems. Contractarians acknowledge that efficiency “has
little to say about the legitimacy of initial distributions of wealth.”117
Nonetheless, contractarians (1) believe that such social and environ-
mental ills are caused by actors and factors other than corporations
and pursuit of shareholder value,118 or (2) believe that even despite
these shortcomings, corporate laws and policies based on efficiency
arguments create corporations that effect more benefits (i.e., wealth
creation) than detriments (e.g., inequitable wealth creation and
112 Id. at 3.
113 Millon, supra note 94, at 1387.
114 STOUT, supra note 2, at 48-50.
115 Id. at 53-54.
116 GREENFIELD, supra note 98, at 19; see also Millon, supra note 94, at 1383 (“To com-
munitarians, life chances should not depend entirely on accidents of birth and bargaining
power: people are entitled to more out of life than what they can pay for.”).
117 WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 87, at 5.
118 Dent, supra note 104, at 1108 (“In the last twenty-five years, too much of our eco-
nomic gains have gone to the wealthiest Americans; income for most Americans has stag-
nated. The resultant deepening of economic inequality is disturbing. Most of this trend
stems from changes in technology, the globalization of economic activity, unchecked immi-
gration, American tax policies, and changing social mores (like the divergence of class
attitudes toward marriage) having nothing to do with corporate governance.”).
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externalities).119
Once students recognize the underlying norms and values
presented in contractarian legal theory, they can begin to unpack
them and address their implications for positive corporate laws and
policy. In the Clinic seminar, students are asked: What definitions of
efficiency are used? Is efficiency the only standard by which law and
policymakers can or should evaluate and create corporate laws? What,
if any, other standards are possible and desirable? Desirable from
whose standpoint? Does equity or sustainability have a role to play in
corporate law? Is there room for sustainability arguments in con-
tractarian theory? How and when should equity and sustainability
give way to efficiency arguments? What is the purpose of the corpora-
tion? Is there a single purpose such as shareholder value maximization
or can there be multiple purposes? Do efficiency arguments necessa-
rily mean that the corporate form should have the default characteris-
tics it currently has?120 These questions are not purely theoretical or
posed without context or practicality. Rather, students confront these
issues and questions as they engage in client work that raises these
issues.
2. Unpacking Communitarian Theory
Communitarians, on the other hand, start from the premise that
“the market alone cannot adequately fulfill basic human needs for
everyone because many people lack the resources to participate effec-
tively in the market.”121 Communitarians acknowledge that financial
markets facilitate enormous economic growth but openly question the
ability of un-regulated markets to promote economic equality or other
desirable social and environmental outcomes. Some communitarians
point to the tremendous global economic growth between 1970 and
2007 (before the 2008 economic downturn), but the lack of compara-
119 See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of
Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 48-50 (2004).
120 See COLEMAN, supra note 108, at 95-132 (posing similar questions as “a fully ade-
quate inquiry into the foundations of the economic approach to law”). Bruce Ackerman
poses similar questions while defending the third year of law school in response to Presi-
dent Obama’s call for shortening law school to two years. Ackerman argues that law stu-
dents should not be left to learn only the blackletter law but also taught “a broader
understanding of the fundamental values of the American legal tradition” through social
sciences, statistics, and economics. Students “must confront fundamental issues: When do
free markets fail the test of economic efficiency? When should efficiency be trumped by
justice? When do impressive-looking statistics amount to fancy ways of lying?” Bruce Ack-
erman, “Why legal education should last for three years,” WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2013)
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-legal-education-should-last-for-three-years/
2013/09/06/55d80c06-1025-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html).
121 Millon, supra note 94, at 1383.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYC\20-1\NYC107.txt unknown Seq: 34  8-NOV-13 9:24
248 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:215
ble social and environmental returns.122 Communitarians attack effi-
ciency arguments on the grounds that laws and policies grounded in
efficiency and free-market principles perpetuate inequality:
[M]aximizing returns to money means maximizing financial returns
to people who already have money; i.e. making the rich richer. All
too often, what conventional economic growth indicators actually
measure is the rate at which the rich are expropriating the resources
on which the majority of the world’s people depend for their modest
livelihoods, and converting them to products destined for a garbage
dump after a brief useful life, to generate financial assets for people
who already have more money than they need.123
The normative values underlying communitarian theory are more
obvious, perhaps because it is an alternative to the dominant con-
tractarian theory. The simple act of distinguishing an alternate leads
one to highlight contractarian theory based on normative differences.
Communitarians’ normative worldview is that of a “shared commu-
nity” in which “individuals owe obligations to each other that exist
independently of contract.”124 The social, environmental, and eco-
nomic health of this shared community depends on everyone’s behav-
ior, collectively and individually. Communitarians couch their positive
law solutions and policy prescriptions in these terms. For example,
Greenfield argues that: “Instead of using corporate law—which pro-
duces the fabric of governance for our most important and powerful
nongovernmental institutions—to accentuate the antagonisms in soci-
ety, perhaps we would want to craft a method of corporate govern-
122 David Korten, More Than Corporations: A New Economy for a New Era, in SUMMIT
ON THE FUTURE OF THE CORPORATION 33 (Corp. 20/20, Paper No. 3, 2007).  (“In contrast
to the indicators of financial capital, indicators of health of the planet tell a very different
story. The Living Planet Index, an indicator of the health of the world’s freshwater, ocean,
and land-based ecosystems, declined by 30 percent since 1970 . . . Indicators of human
capital—the skills, knowledge, psychological health, capacity for critical thought, and
moral responsibility characteristic of a fully functioning person—and of social capital—the
enduring relationships of mutual trust and caring that are the foundation of healthy fami-
lies, communities and societies—point to equally unfavorable trends. By the measure of
financial capital, we humans are on a path to limitless prosperity. By the measure of living
capital, the aggregate of human, social, and natural capital, we are on a suicidal path to
increasing deprivation and ultimate self-extinction.”).
123 Id. at 33 (“According to a recent UN study, the richest 1 percent of the world’s
adults now own 40 percent of all global assets. The poorest 50 percent own only 1 percent.
This distribution of ownership is a proxy measure for the global distribution of power . . . .
The greater the inequality, the greater the power of the privileged minority to change the
rules to accelerate their expropriation of the declining pool of real wealth, and the greater
the hardship and desperation of those excluded.”).
124 Millon, supra note 94; see also  Ridley-Duff, supra note 32, at 383
(“[C]ommunitarians focus less on the development of individual rights and the pursuit of
self-interest and more on utilitarian arguments that ‘shared values’ can be developed to
achieve a ‘common good.’”).
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ance that promotes harmony and partnership.”125 These values also
lead communitarians to espouse a redesign of corporate law from pri-
vate law to public law. “Corporate law should not be seen as a narrow,
private-law field for the acolytes of law and economics. Rather, it
should be debated as if it were a part of larger social and
macroeconomic policy.”126
Many scholars critique communitarian theory on the grounds that
empirical research validating communitarian theory is lacking—it has
either not been done or is in its infancy.127 That is, there is no evidence
that society is bettered (or total financial wealth and societal health is
increased) when economic actors take a “shared values” approach to
doing business. Moreover, while communitarians have been consistent
about attacking the shareholder wealth maximization norm and con-
tractarian theory, they have been less capable in providing a concrete
agenda of legal reforms that would achieve communitarian goals.
Some advocate government regulation and intervention while others
promote “collaboration rather than authority” whether the authority
source is shareholder authority or government authority.128 Indeed, it
remains to be seen whether sustainability goals are wholly incompati-
ble with the shareholder wealth maximization norm or with con-
tractarian theory. As I have noted in other work, so-called impact
investors can “contract” with a firm and use their investment dollars
to ensure that the firm produces socially- and environmentally-re-
sponsible outcomes.129
125 GREENFIELD, supra note 98, at 27.
126 Id.; see also Charles Handy, The Unintended Consequences of Good Ideas, HARV.
BUS. REV. MAG. (Oct. 2012), http://hbr.org/2012/10/the-unintended-consequences-of-good-
ideas/ar/1 (arguing that the corporation itself has become a power center similar to a mon-
archy outside of democratic control and that it should be redesigned to take into account
long-term interests rather than short-term shareholder or management self-interest); Elk-
ington, supra note 4, at 6 (noting that the corporate governance agenda has rightfully con-
verged with societal concerns through corporate responsibility, social entrepreneurship,
and sustainable development agendas).
127 Dent, supra note 104, at 1110 (arguing that there is little empirical data to show that
short-termism exists, or if it does exist, that it causes the types of problems that com-
munitarians claim); GREENFIELD, supra note 98, at 3; see also SISODIA, SHETH & WOLFE,
supra note 31 (providing anecdotal, but not empirical, research on firms that have adopted
a stakeholder relationship management approach that aligns with communitarian theory).
128 Ridley-Duff, supra note 32, at 385. An example of a collaborative ownership ap-
proach is the worker cooperative discussed supra Part I.
129 Plerhoples, supra note 13, at 251-56. Some researchers have also noted a middle
ground where shareholder value maximization is not synonymous with short-termism.
Rather, they lay blame on short-term shareholders and recommend giving a “favored role
to long-term shareholders” as well as “finding roles for other actors in the corporate
drama—boards, customers, employees, lenders, regulators, nonprofit groups—that enable
those actors to take on some of the burden of providing money, information, and especially
discipline” to the modern corporation. Fox & Losch, supra note 2, at 57 (espousing stake-
holder capitalism “as a recognition that today’s shareholders aren’t quite up to making
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Finally, a major fault of legal reforms arising from communitarian
theory relates to capital markets—can investment be attracted on a
large scale to firms that reject shareholder primacy and give equal pri-
ority to all stakeholders? For some, the answer is an unequivocal
“no.”130 As an example, benefit corporation legislation has been en-
acted in twelve states since 2010; it offers stakeholder governance in
an off-the-shelf legal form. And yet very few firms have opted into the
benefit corporation form, and investment in those that have reflects
an infinitesimal scale.131
Once students recognize the underlying norms and critiques of
communitarian legal theory, they can begin to address their implica-
tions for positive laws. In the seminar, students are asked: What defi-
nitions of “community” are used? Are we referring to the local
community, national community, or global community? How are “de-
sirable” social and environmental outputs and outcomes defined? Are
social and environmental outputs and outcomes measureable? What is
gained by measuring blended value instead of financial value? What is
lost? What is the purpose of the corporation? Can corporate actors
synthesize multiple purposes? How? Again, this inquiry into the role
of the corporation and corporate governance law is based in theory
but is not merely an academic exercise. Representing social enterprise
clients raises these otherwise theoretical issues and provides students
with a practical experience through which to discuss them; students
also realize how otherwise abstract concepts practically affect their
clients.
As an example, consider the social enterprise models described in
Part I. When students encounter these business models through their
client representation, students must critically examine these business
models in order to provide their clients with sound legal advice. A
client in its initial stages of operation may ask for advice on which
business model to adopt, or ask for advice on implementing a certain
business model. A for-profit social enterprise might ask for advice on
how to structure the client’s relationship with the charities it funds, or
how to convey to its consumers that its operations are environmen-
tally-friendly and sustainable, or what policies and strategies the client
should adopt to prioritize its social mission over the long-term.
To illustrate further, a start-up social enterprise client of the
shareholder capitalism work”).
130 See generally Bainbridge, supra note 1.
131 Maryland was the first state to enact the benefit corporation legislation in 2010. As
of May 28, 2013, only 60 Maryland benefit corporations and LLCs have been formed. Con-
ference Report, The State of Social Enterprise: Maryland (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.
slideshare.net/changematters/maryland-benefitcorporations-analysis-full-report.
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SENL Clinic recently asked students to provide advice on adopting
the B1G1 business model. Students will conduct their research, which
involves determining the client’s business and social objectives, under-
standing the tax and other legal implications of the B1G1 business
model, comparing the B1G1 models to other possible philanthropic
structures the client might use, and writing an advice memorandum to
the client with the relevant considerations specific to the client’s goals.
The students’ legal assessment will necessarily entails an acknowledg-
ment on the students’ part that the B1G1 business model has many
critics who argue that the model is not sustainable.132 Critics argue
that the model relies heavily on the charitable heartstrings of individu-
als in developed countries who are willing to pay marked-up prices to
fund the creation of similar products and services in developing coun-
tries. This willingness by consumers in developed countries to pay
above-market prices, in order to create beneficiaries in developing
countries, is a subsidy that may be only temporary, depending on
trends or fads in the consumers’ countries.133 Critics also argue that
the B1G1 model also floods developing markets with free products
thereby diminishing the need and capacity of a developing country to
manufacture and produce its own products for its own markets.134
132 Cheryl Davenport, The Broken Buy-One-Give-One Model: 3 Ways to Fix TOMS
Shoes, CO.EXIST, www.fastcoexist.com/1679628/the?broken?buy?one?give?one?model?
three?ways?to?save?toms?shoes (last visited Jan. 16, 2013) (“First, the TOMS buy-one-
give-one model does not actually solve a social problem. Rather, the charitable act of do-
nating a free pair of shoes serves as little more than a short-term fix in a system in need of
long-term, multi-faceted economic development, health, sanitation, and education
solutions.”).
133 It should be noted that other social enterprise business models create subsidies in
other ways, including by courting social investors who expect lower rates of return on their
investments in social enterprises. However, to some, the B1G1 business model is not
“true” social enterprise because the money used to manufacture the in-kind donation
product comes from profits and is not a part of the company’s core business operations,
and the internal corporate governance structure of the company remains unchanged. S.
Bansal, Shopping for a Better World, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://opinion
ator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/09/shopping-for-a-better-world/ (critiquing B1G1 model
and quoting Gregory Dees, Professor at Duke Fuqua School of Business: “In fact, most
development experts refrain from painting B1G1 companies as social enterprises, as some
outlets have, and instead consider them philanthropic ventures.  ‘To me, it’s only a social
enterprise if the social impact comes from core operations,’ Dees said.  ‘How you use the
money afterward is your choice.’”). Other B1G1 models exist that do attempt to make
their operations environmentally-friendly, even though relying on charitable purchases.
For example, Better World Books donates books and funds to literacy programs in devel-
oping countries with every developed country purchase. However, it also diverts books
from landfills and offsets pollution caused by shipping through carbon credits. Triple Bot-
tom Line: Social Enterprise, BETTER WORLD BOOKS, http://www.betterworldbooks.com/
info.aspx?f=bottomlines (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
134 Kiera Butler, Does TOMS Shoes Really Help People?, MOTHER JONES (May 13,
2012, 11:01 PM), www.motherjones.com/environment/2012/05/toms?shoes?buy?one?give?
one (noting that in-kind donations hurt local shoemakers where TOMS Shoes are donated
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Likewise, with a theoretical grounding, SENL Clinic students also
provide their clients with advice on whether to incorporate as a bene-
fit corporation or some other organizational form such as a coopera-
tive, depending on the client objectives. Students must critically
examine organizational forms, their critiques, and how each might fit
a client’s objectives. Students consider the major critiques of the bene-
fit corporation that include: (i) the statute’s rejection of shareholder
wealth maximization but maintenance of shareholder primacy such
that non-shareholder stakeholders do not have a private right of ac-
tion to enforce the benefit corporation’s social or environmental mis-
sion,135 and (ii) the likelihood that a traditional corporation can
accomplish the same public benefits promised by a benefit
corporation.
Students also evaluate social enterprise business models while
conducting client intake during the semester. Clinic students often en-
counter a for-profit business that labels itself as a social enterprise but
lacks any of the characteristics of a social enterprise. The entrepre-
neur seeking legal assistance makes unsupported claims that the social
enterprise benefits others or has a motive beyond profitmaking for
investors. Upon investigation, the students responsible for the client
intake process typically find that the entrepreneur has good intentions
but either does not understand the concept of social enterprise or does
not know how to incorporate social enterprise strategies into his or
her business. The students responsible for the client intake then lead a
discussion during seminar to determine whether the particular for-
profit business meets the client selection perimeters of the SENL
Clinic. The discussion centers on social enterprise business models and
whether the entrepreneur’s business model, as presented, is capable of
because market competition is decreased).
135 Although directors of a benefit corporation must consider the interest of non-share-
holder stakeholders in making decisions, non-shareholder stakeholders have no private
right of action against the corporation or its board of directors, and directors owe no fiduci-
ary duties to non-shareholder stakeholders. Non-shareholder stakeholders must trust that
the board of directors is acting in their interests or protect themselves through contracting
with the firm outside the scope of corporate governance laws. Given the inability to hold
directors accountable for ordinary business decisions through shareholder derivatives suits,
shareholders must also trust that the board is acting in their interests, but are on notice that
their financial interests may not necessarily trump other stakeholders’ interests. On the
other hand, the benefit corporation may be palatable to some non-shareholder stakehold-
ers (and legislators considering adoption of these corporate forms) given the assumption
that the social enterprises’ directors and shareholders are altruistic, possibly willing to ac-
cept below-market returns, and believe in the social enterprise’s social or environmental
mission. For a full discussion of the flexible purpose corporation statute and its embrace of
shareholder primacy, see Plerhoples, supra note 13, at 250 (arguing that the flexible pur-
pose corporation does not take a redistributive approach and rejects shareholder wealth
maximization but embraces shareholder primacy).
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achieving sustainability or charitable objectives. Students also con-
sider whether they can assist the entrepreneur by educating him or her
about social enterprise strategies to achieve social and/or environmen-
tal missions.
IV. REPRESENTING SOCIAL ENTERPRISES
In the SENL Clinic, students assume the important role the cor-
porate lawyer plays in facilitating their clients’ sustainability goals.
Students gain skills crucial to practicing law while expanding their
knowledge and critical-thinking about the growing social enterprise
sector.
A. Solving Novel and Unstructured Problems
The rule of law, as well as mechanisms, to achieve sustainability
in the corporate sector are under-developed. Sustainability economics
and sustainability accounting are relatively new fields.136 Environmen-
tal and social scientists, economists, ethicists, and legal scholars are
laying the framework for determining what efficiency and justice
means with respect to sustainability. Environmental and social scien-
tists, lawyers, and policymakers must translate those theories into pol-
icy and positive law; corporate and nonprofit managers, boards of
directors, and accountants must develop and apply accountability and
measurement mechanisms; boards, managers, shareholders, and
stakeholders must determine the mechanisms’ utility and practical-
ity.137 Business lawyers have an important role to play in facilitating
sustainability in the corporate sector.138 The SENL Clinic engages law
students in this multi-layered endeavor through their representation
of social enterprise clients.
Business lawyers facilitate economic activity. They structure
transactions and navigate laws and regulations for the benefit of their
organizational clients. A business lawyer must understand the client’s
business as well as the context and regulatory framework in which the
client operates.139 The emerging sustainability field thus requires that
136 For example, while the Financial Accounting Standards Board was created in 1973,
the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board just launched on October 4, 2012. Welcome
to the SASB’s Public Launch, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.
sasb.org/sasb/launch/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
137 See, e.g., Ruth, supra note 68, at 335 (stating that economists must work with other
disciplines to create relevant policy).
138 See Elkington & Hartigan, supra note 74, at 211 (noting that “favorable legal and tax
regimes” are needed to facilitate social enterprise).
139 Jones, Promoting Social and Economic Justice, supra note 6, at 263-64 (“In order to
accomplish the client’s goals, students must learn about the business from the client and
other sources, including experts in other disciplines . . . . Students have to learn not only
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business lawyers be able to articulate, advocate for, and take into ac-
count the client’s sustainability goals when structuring a transaction or
otherwise facilitating the client’s business strategy or operations. In
many cases, because sustainability is a concept that is still being cre-
ated and shaped into a viable business model, business lawyers must
help their business clients by spotting routine and novel legal issues,
navigating legal gray areas, fitting sustainability initiatives into the ex-
isting legal and regulatory framework, and assisting in creating a new
framework that can accommodate sustainability goals.
The existing legal and regulatory organizational framework is
largely predicated on the division of economic and social activity into
three sectors—for-profit, nonprofit, and governmental—and factors
of production into three segments—capital, labor, and land. The
emergence of business models that attempt to combine principles
from one sector with those of another sector or blur distinctions be-
tween capital and labor disrupt this division. For example, existing se-
curities and labor laws do not take into account the pluralist business
model described in Part I. Existing securities laws are aimed at pro-
tecting the investor and labor laws are aimed at protecting the em-
ployee. These laws must be re-evaluated when businesses employ
models that do not so easily distinguish between owner and em-
ployee.140 Lawyers are particularly adept at providing an analytical
framework to help business clients think through the legal issues that
will arise as they create and implement sustainability initiatives and
structures. The business lawyer thus takes on the role of “problem-
solver” in partnership with her social enterprise client.141 There are
many skills required to represent organizational clients, including
making complex law accessible to clients, crafting and defining legal
relationships between multiple parties, transaction planning and nego-
the facts of the case, but must learn about the business from their clients.”); see also, WIL-
LIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 87, at 8 (“In business law, the lawyer who fails to under-
stand the economics of a problem usually fails to find a satisfactory solution to the
problem.”).
140 See ORSI, supra note 16 (rethinking existing employment laws to better serve differ-
ent business models like cooperatives).
141 See Susan R. Jones, Supporting Urban Entrepreneurs: Law, Policy, and the Role of
Lawyers in Small Business Development, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 82 (2007) (“Increas-
ingly, clients want lawyers who are problem solvers.”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When
Winning Isn’t Everything: The Lawyer as Problem Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 915
(2000) (“A good problem solver must take the problem, transaction, or matter presented
by the client, analyze what the problem or situation requires, and then use creative abilities
to solve, resolve, arrange, structure, or transform the situation so it is made better for the
client, not worse.”); see also Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal
Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 244 n.9 (1984) (“[Business lawyers engage in]
joint problem solving, in which, through cooperation, the size of the pie, and hence the size
of the piece received by each party, can be increased.”).
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tiating, contract drafting (in addition to skills required in representing
both organizational and individual clients—e.g., interviewing, effec-
tive communication, and client counseling).142 However, representing
a social enterprise client, in particular, can require an additional skill
worth highlighting—solving novel and unstructured legal problems.
“Helping students acquire an understanding of legal problem-
solving and begin developing their expertise as problem-solvers is the
most important task of legal education.”143 Lawyers encounter un-
structured legal problems throughout their careers; the competent or
expert lawyer is able to apply their knowledge, skills, practice judg-
ment, and method of practice to resolve their clients’ unstructured
problems. Clinical legal education is particularly adept at teaching stu-
dents problem-solving skills because (i) students take on the role of
lawyer and are able to practice such skills; and (ii) clinical law profes-
sors guide students through this role while requiring the student to
continually reflect on, theorize, and re-apply their improved knowl-
edge and skills.144 This reflective process teaches students how to
learn from their own experience, a skill that facilitates the transition
throughout one’s legal career from novice, to competent attorney, and
finally, to expert. Student practice in the clinical setting is therefore
different than student practice through employment or an internship
because students are taught self-reflection and self-assessment tools
that they can use throughout their careers to continually enhance their
problem-solving skills.145
Representing social enterprises facilitates student development of
142 These are the same skills that are required of advising the typical transactional law
clinic clients—small businesses, start-ups, and nonprofit organizations. Such skills have
been detailed in numerous other books and articles and therefore they will not be repeated
here. See, e.g., ROGER S. HAYDOCK & PETER B. KNAPP, LAWYERING: PRACTICE AND
PLANNING (2003); Susan D. Bennett, Embracing the Ill-Structured Problem in a Commu-
nity Economic Development Clinic, 9 CLIN. L. REV. 45 (2002); Karl S. Okamoto, Teaching
Transactional Lawyering, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 69 (2009); Lisa Penland, What a Transactional
Lawyer Needs to Know: Identifying and Implementing Competencies for Transactional
Lawyers, 5 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRS. 118 (2008).
143 Roy Stuckey, Teaching with Purpose: Defining and Achieving Desired Outcomes in
Clinical Law Courses, 13 CLIN. L. REV. 807, 811, 816 (2006) (arguing that “one of the
strengths of experiential education is that it gives students opportunities to practice solving
problems and to receive feedback on the quality of their efforts . . . . Problem-solving skills
can be developed only by actually working through the process of resolving problems.”).
144 Id. at 816-17; see also Steven Hartwell, Six Easy Pieces: Teaching Experientially, 41
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1011, 1013 (2004) (describing the four stage process of learning from
experience: “Experience is the immersing of one’s self in a task or similar event—the do-
ing. Reflection involves stepping back and reflecting on both the cognitive and affective
aspects of what happened or was done. Theory entails interpreting the task or event, mak-
ing generalizations, or seeing the experience in a larger context. Application enables one to
plan for or make predictions about encountering the event or task a second time.”).
145 Stuckey, supra note 143 (quoting SULLIVAN, ET AL., supra note 84, at 178).
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problem-solving skills precisely because legal issues pertaining to so-
cial enterprise are often novel or unstructured. Social enterprises may
present issues that the clinical law professor, law student, nor poten-
tially any practicing lawyer has faced. There is no such thing as “social
enterprise law,” and sustainability has been called a “craft rather than
a science.”146 Molly Scott Cato, Professor of Strategy and Sus-
tainability at the University of Roehampton, advises that because sus-
tainability is an area of “limited knowledge and uncertainty,”
educators who teach sustainability should “adopt an approach of
shared learning.”147 Shared, or collaborative learning is a pedagogical
tool often used in clinical legal education, and applies quite well to
representing clients which themselves are working at the cross section
of multiple sectors and legal “gray” areas.
The laws governing social enterprises arise from corporate law
and nonprofit law, as well as the host of other regulatory regimes af-
fecting nonprofit and business operations, such as securities law, em-
ployment law, environmental law, consumer law, and trade law. Law
students representing social enterprises must learn these various legal
regimes and develop an understanding of how they affect and can be
applied to social enterprises. This analysis and learning process re-
quires higher-order thinking and problem-solving because it requires
adaptation of the law and legal theories and not just application or
replication.148 Admittedly, some of the legal issues that social enter-
prises face are the same issues that any organizational client might
face. However, some legal issues will be novel. Consider, for example,
thinking through how to classify money paid by customers to an or-
ganization like Panera Cares—a community cafe´, organized as a non-
profit organization and funded by for-profit Panera Bread company.
Panera Cares operates with a mission to address food insecurity.149
Customers may (but are not required to) pay for food from a Panera
Cares cafe´ at a suggested donation price; those who cannot afford to
146 Moll Scott Cato, What the Willow Teaches: Sustainability Learning as Craft 3 (Jan.
11, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“Given what we know about the
prevalence of uncertainty and ignorance in the field of sustainability, the exposure of our
young people to sustainability experimentation in the field is likely to generate precisely
the sorts of creative and experimental solutions that are so lacking in a policy arena framed
by techniques of measurement and projection.”).
147 Id. at 1, 5 (“It might enable educators to escape the ‘deadly habit’ no. 3: ‘Teachers
lead, students follow’ and help us all arrive at a learning situation where ‘pedagogical
processes bring student and teacher together in their shared ignorance and mutual desire
to make sense of their world’”) (quoting E.L. McWilliam, Unlearning Pedagogy, JOURNAL
OF LEARNING DESIGN, 1/1: 1-11 (2005).
148 See Kosuri, Impact in 3D, supra note 8, at 23 (Kosuri contends that “the best lawyers
employ sophisticated skills that are grounded in the lawyer’s role as problem-solver.”).
149 Our Mission, PANERA CARES, http://paneracares.org/our-mission/ (last visited Jan.
30, 2012).
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pay are not required to. A tax lawyer easily spots the legal issues with
this revenue-producing structure—is the money received by the or-
ganization a tax-free donation or taxable income? Does it matter if
the money received is from a low-income person or a person capable
of paying market-price? Does it matter if the organization receives
enough revenue to covers its costs and therefore runs a surplus, or if
low-income people are rarely served?150
Consider, also, choice of entity issues. For social entrepreneurs
that attempt to blend social, environmental, and financial value, and
work within a “gray” legal arena, this issue is a crucial one. The distin-
guishing characteristic of a nonprofit organization is the prohibition
against private inurement. Nonprofits do not have shareholders and
“insiders” cannot receive excess benefits from the nonprofit. On the
other hand, managers of for-profit corporations have a fiduciary duty
to pursue the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders,
which is often (even if incorrectly) taken to mean maximizing share-
holder value. Many social entrepreneurs are using for-profit business
models and strategies to work to address social and environmental
issues or create a public benefit. They do not pursue shareholder value
maximization and yet their business models or strategies do not work
if they cannot attract investors (and distribute at least some profits to
investors). The risk to a social enterprise in starting out in the wrong
organizational form is acute. Consider, for example, Couchsurfing,
which started as a New Hampshire nonprofit organization but con-
verted to for-profit corporation with B Corp certification status after
being denied tax-exempt status from the IRS and realizing that it
could generate a considerable revenue stream (and investment) by
converting to a for-profit organization.151 However, because the assets
of nonprofit organizations are held in trust form and must be used for
a charitable mission, to convert to a for-profit corporation, the assets
of the non-profit organization had to be brought out by investors—
this was a considerable and potentially unnecessary cost had Couch-
surfing started as a for-profit organization. Moreover, Couchsurfing’s
loyal fan base was critical of the conversion, likely costing Couchsurf-
150 Professor Cassady Brewer raised this scenario concerning Panera Cares at the AALS
2013 Annual Meeting, Section on Nonprofit and Philanthropy Law panel on Social Enter-
prise (Jan. 6, 2013). Customer payments for food at Panera Cares are likely to be consid-
ered “exempt function income” made to further the organization’s exempt purpose. Only
the amounts paid that exceed the fair market value of the food are deductible as charitable
contributions.
151 Nicole Perlroth, Non-Profit CouchSurfing Raises Millions In Funding, FORBES ON-
LINE (Aug. 24, 2011, 9:51 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nicoleperlroth/2011/08/24/non-
profit-couchsurfing-raises-millions-in-funding/.
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ing considerable time, money, and effort to restore its public image.152
Additionally, as noted in Part I, new corporate forms that allow
for-profit businesses to take into account non-shareholder stakehold-
ers have been passed into law in at least twelve U.S. states, but the use
of those forms has been moderate at best.153 Because these forms are
recent developments in corporate law (e.g., the benefit corporation
statute was enacted in February 2013 in the District of Columbia),
there is a lack of judicial precedent adjudicating claims against such
corporations, making it unclear how their non-shareholder pursuits
will be interpreted should a derivate claim or benefit enforcement
proceeding be made. Law students will have to gather information
about their client, identify the legal “gray” areas involved, and pro-
vide the best advice to a social enterprise clients regarding choice of
entity with respect to these novel corporate forms. Dealing with such
novel and unstructured problems that social enterprises present gives
students the opportunity to develop their problem-solving skills, as
well as develop self-reflection tools for career-long learning.
B. Information Sharing and Knowledge Creation
In addition to learning problem-solving skills, representing social
enterprises presents students with the opportunity to step into the role
of legal advocate for the social enterprise sector by engaging in knowl-
edge creation and information facilitation. Transactional legal work
that navigates and implements substantive corporate law is not often
viewed—by law students or by law professors—as a means of accom-
plishing advocacy or public interest work.154 Praveen Kosuri’s recent
article describing the societal impact that transactional law clinics can
have through synergies of service, pedagogy, and skills substantially
advanced the dialogue about transactional law clinics and their poten-
tial to achieve an impact comparable to that of community economic
development (CED) work.155 Kosuri describes the history of transac-
152 Bobbie Johnson, After Going For-Profit, Couchsurfing Faces User Revolt, GIGAOM
(Sept. 1, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/2011/09/01/after-going-for-profit-couchsurf-
ing-faces-user-revolt/.
153 See supra note 131.
154 Note, however, that there is growing interest in employing business law in the public
interest. “Business Law in the Public Interest” was the recent title of a symposium held at
University of California, Irvine School of Law, with presented articles subsequently pub-
lished in the UC Irvine Law Review.
155 Kosuri, “Impact” in 3D, supra note 8, at 4 (“It is more difficult for lawyers and law
students to see how transactional law can affect change in the same manner as litigation.
Law schools certainly do not teach it. If there are any courses dealing with transactional
lawyering they are almost always ‘deals’ oriented or skills-based classes, but rarely do they
promote transactional law as an impact strategy to affect change. Moreover, outside the
CED world, transactional lawyers rarely come from social justice backgrounds. This com-
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tional law clinics, the typical legal work in which they engage, and
encourages transactional law clinicians to adopt impact strategies be-
cause “impact work unlocks the potential for enhanced skills develop-
ment and deeper learning.”156
To that end, the SENL Clinic is taking steps to adopt a “com-
bined advocacy” model that is more typical of a litigation-based clinic
or CED clinic. In the combined advocacy model, Clinic students work
on small-scale client representation and larger-scale projects simulta-
neously and learn valuable advocacy and collaboration skills. Jayashri
Srikantiah and Jennifer Lee Koh describe the combined advocacy
clinic model in the context of an immigration clinic:
By conducting multi-modal advocacy, students work to achieve
broader-scale social change beyond what can typically be achieved
in individual client work. Working on both individual, small-scale
cases and institutional, larger-scale projects also gives rise to syner-
gies in learning, as students reflect on each undertaking in the con-
text of the other. By exposing students to multiple lawyering roles,
diverse tools for effecting social justice, and the complexity of issues
facing the populations served by the clinic, a combined advocacy
clinic deepens students’ ability to engage in problem solving, ex-
pands their exercise of judgment, and most fully develops their pro-
fessional identity.157
In addition to representing individual social enterprise clients, SENL
Clinic students are given the opportunity to act as advocates of the
social enterprise sector by facilitating information and creating knowl-
edge important to the growth of the sector. Information sharing and
knowledge creation are key roles of the business lawyer.158 Business
lawyers aggregate information across their organizational clients and
distinguish patterns, norms, and customary practices within various in-
dustries, thereby creating knowledge about the industry that may not
bination of conditions creates a climate where few lawyers look to employ transactional
law practice as a vehicle for change.”).
156 Id. at 18.
157 Jayashri Srikantiah & Jennifer Lee Koh, Teaching Individual Representation Along-
side Institutional Advocacy: Pedagogical Implications of a Combined Advocacy Clinic, 16
CLIN. L. REV. 451, 452 (2010). A number of clinics including domestic violence, criminal
defense, immigrants’ rights, and community economic development clinics have employed
the combined advocacy approach. See M. Chris Fabricant, Rethinking Criminal Defense
Clinics in “Zero-Tolerance” Policing Regimes, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 351,
344-45 (describing adoption of a combined advocacy approach for the Pace Criminal Jus-
tice Clinic and noting that “a growing trend in clinical education, combined advocacy in-
corporates individual representation and broad-scale advocacy initiatives.”).
158 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?,
74 OR. L. REV. 239, 248-51 (1995) (noting that venture capital lawyers in Silicon Valley
serve as information facilitators and promote business norms and customary practices
within the field by counseling unknowledgeable start-up clients about the reasonable range
of deal terms).
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have existed before. Because the rule of law and mechanisms to
achieve sustainability in the corporate sector are under-developed, the
social enterprise sector needs this kind of legal assistance.159
As a starting point to engage Clinic students with knowledge cre-
ation and information sharing in the social enterprise sector, Clinic
students are involved in in two partnerships. First, the Clinic has
partnered with Law for Change, an online legal resource for social
innovators operated by Lex Mundi Pro Bono Foundation.160 Students
provide legal content to the Law for Change website. Students write
blog entries on laws or cases that they come across during their client
representation that may affect other social entrepreneurs. Students
also draft brief legal guides on discrete legal issues that arise from the
legal research and work that students accomplish for a Clinic client.
For example, a student might draft an advisory memo on the benefits
and disadvantages of converting to a benefit corporation determinate
on a social enterprise’s business model.  Through the partnership with
Lex Mundi Pro Bono Foundation, a student may draft a longer prac-
tice-oriented white paper on a legal issue that he has addressed for a
social enterprise client in the Clinic.161 The student posts the white
paper on the Law for Change website so that others in the sector,
whether lawyers or entrepreneurs, can learn how to navigate a partic-
ular law or issue. By drafting a practice-oriented white paper on a
legal issue that a social enterprise might encounter, the Clinic student
is engaging in information sharing as well as creating possible best
practices for the sector. The student, too, must reflect on his work for
the individual social enterprise client he represents over the semester;
and think about the ways in which a particular piece of legal work
might assist other social enterprises or advance the sector in general.
The student also must identify and synthesize the “value-add” compo-
nent of his legal work, while drafting the practice-oriented white pa-
per in a manner that is accessible and understandable to both other
lawyers and non-lawyers.
159 Compare ORSI, supra note 16, at 16 (“[Transactional attorneys] have a great deal of
work ahead to bring our laws into sync with the realities of a sharing economy . . . .
[S]haring economy lawyers are well positioned to collect stories and examples, and to de-
velop best practices and policy recommendations to adapt our laws to the needs of a chang-
ing economy.”). See also, IFAC, supra note 72, at 8 (noting that certain governance
practices are essential to sustainable success).
160 About Us, LAWFORCHANGE, http://www.lawforchange.org/lfc/About_Us.asp (last
visited Dec. 10, 2012).
161 Students work with their professors and clients to obtain informed consent from cli-
ents, avoid any identifying aspects of the legal representation, and maintain confidentiality
of client information, including client-specific business strategies or other secrets that the
client does not want revealed. Because of client confidentiality and time constraints, not all
students draft materials for the Law for Change website.
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Similarly, the SENL Clinic partners with Ashoka and two other
law school clinics—the International Transactions Clinic at the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School and the Small Business & Community
Economic Development Clinic at The George Washington University
Law School. Ashoka, founded by lawyer Bill Drayton in 1980, is a
leading organization in the social entrepreneurship sector. Ashoka
supports approximately 3,000 social entrepreneurs across 73 countries.
The goal of the collaboration between Ashoka and the three legal
clinics is to advance the development of the legal sector that supports
social entrepreneurship. Our collaborative approach is two-pronged.
With Ashoka as their client, students at the three law schools collabo-
rate to develop and share best practices for the sector by producing
legal toolkits and research that help Ashoka further its charitable mis-
sion of supporting the social entrepreneurship sector. The students
also represent social entrepreneurs identified by Ashoka in transac-
tional and business legal matters that help them launch and scale their
social enterprises.
By stepping into the role of legal advocate, students begin to see
that lawyers are not neutral arbiters of the law. While some argue that
a lawyer’s role is amoral and client autonomy is sacrosanct,162 other
legal ethicists call upon lawyers to deliberately shape their clients’
preferences to serve justice.163 Representing social entrepreneurs,
many of whom are novices and actively seek out attorneys for strate-
gic advice around sustainability issues, prohibits students from taking
an amoral approach to the law. Students are called on to actively
shape their clients’ interests by advising them on the pursuit of chari-
table or sustainable objectives. Moreover, students must consider
“fairness.” For example, Clinic students may represent a nonprofit cli-
ent on a transaction to provide services in a low-income community or
developing country. Students research the particular service industry,
and provide the nonprofit client with advisable business terms based
on what other nonprofits do in the sector and based on applicable law.
If the nonprofit client wishes to deviate widely from customary busi-
ness terms in order to take advantage of the unrepresented and disad-
vantaged party in the transaction, a student must consider the ethics
of assisting the client.
V. LIMITATIONS
There are several conceptual and practical challenges to repre-
senting social enterprise clients in a clinic. Some of these challenges
162 See e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Prob-
lem, and Some Possibilities, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J., Vol. 11, No.4 613-35 (Autumn 1986).
163 See e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988).
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arise out of serving organizational clients generally, whether they are
social enterprises or not. Such limitations include: (1) whether matters
are so complex that students do not have an active role in the client
representation to the detriment of student learning;164 (2) the consid-
erable amount of time needed to find and select clients with appropri-
ate projects for students compared to court-referred litigation clients;
and (3) objections from the private bar and potentially members of
the clinical community in serving for-profit clients. Because other arti-
cles discuss these issues in the context of other organizational clients
that are not social enterprises,165 the limitations discussed below focus
on those that are particularly acute for the representation of social
enterprise clients.
A. Chasing Trends
First and foremost, one must consider whether corporate sus-
tainability and the entire social enterprise movement is a short-lived
trend that will be replaced by another trend in the corporate sector. If
social enterprise is just a fad, focusing on it may not prepare law stu-
dents for legal careers, and would be a waste of useful law school re-
sources. For example, the benefit corporation and other new
organizational forms may never be used in significant numbers or ad-
judicated by courts in meaningful and useful ways: such was the case
with constituency statutes of the 1980s, which were enacted in many
states but never ripened to their full potential.166 Or an economic
boom could decrease the imperative for companies to focus on de-
mand for resources and human capital, or environmental effects. It is
also inevitable that many social enterprises and corporate sus-
tainability initiatives will fail. That is the nature of entrepreneurship
and experimentation.
One can look to the potential benefits to corporations as a ba-
164 See Katherine R. Kruse, Biting Off What They Can Chew: Strategies for Involving
Students in Problem-Solving Beyond Individual Client Representation, 8 CLIN. L. REV. 405,
410, 429 (2002).
165 See, e.g., Kosuri, Impact in 3D, supra note 8, at 42-45 (discussing the challenges of
representing “impact” clients in an entrepreneurial law clinic).
166 Constituency statutes were promulgated in many states in the 1980s to protect local
corporations in response to increased out-of-state takeover activity. Generally, a constitu-
ency statute allows directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies
when making business decisions for the corporation. Non-shareholder constituencies in-
clude employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, and the communities where the corpora-
tion is situated or does business; the national, state, and local economies; both the long-
term and short-term interests of shareholders and the corporation; other community and
societal factors. Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Stat-
utes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land? 42 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 765, 782 (2008).
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rometer of whether the social enterprise movement will endure and
sustainability goals will constitute a long-term shift in corporate be-
havior. That is, some advocates believe that sustainability issues are
important to the well-being of the world’s economic, financial, and
social health, and therefore worth pursuit for their own sake. More
importantly, corporate managers see an untapped potential in pursu-
ing social and environmental objectives because greater social, envi-
ronmental, and economic equality and sustainability will lead to larger
markets of customers and consumers for their products and services.
So while some may advocate equality and sustainability for their own
right, corporate managers may advocate it because, in the long run, it
opens up new markets.
For example, Proctor & Gamble (“P&G”) operates an initiative
called “Protecting Futures: Keeping Girls in School” through which it
partners with non-governmental organizations to provide puberty ed-
ucation, sanitary protection, and sanitary facilities to girls in develop-
ing countries.167 The goal of the initiative is to provide the means for
girls to attend school during their menstrual cycles (purportedly girls
in the targeted countries miss school a few days a month while manag-
ing their menstrual cycles). While the goal is admirable, undoubtedly
corporate managers at P&G must also see the potential to capture the
loyalty of future customers and expand into a new market—if the girls
stay in school, do well, and obtain employment they will have the
funds to continue using the P&G products by purchasing them.
Similar logic is the basis of many corporate social responsibility
initiatives, including those corporations who establish and/or fund ed-
ucational programs—these companies see the need to continue to ed-
ucate their future workforce, often with technological skills in math,
science, and engineering. There is no denying that corporations also
have to contend with the effects of climate change, increased natural
resource demand, and political unrest on their manufacturing, supply
chains, workforce, product distribution, consumer market, and other
business operations. It will not be easy or profitable for corporations
to continue business as usual without some understanding, accept-
ance, and incorporation of sustainability goals. For these reasons—
both profit-driven and resource-driven—it is unlikely that the new
emphasis on sustainability in the corporate sector will fade.
B. Transfer to Future Practice
Although the clinical legal education community focuses on
167 Always and Tampax: Protecting the Futures of Girls, PROCTOR & GAMBLE,  http://
www.pg.com/en_US/sustainability/social_responsibility/protecting_futures.shtml (last vis-
ited Jan. 11, 2013).
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teaching students the practice methods and proficiencies they need to
enter post-graduation law practice, it remains to be seen empirically if
clinics truly prepare law students for practice. In The Clinic Effect,
Professors Jeffrey Selbin and Rebecca Sandefur analyzed the data
from a longitudinal study of the careers of new lawyers. Selbin and
Sandefur found that 62% of respondents rated clinical courses and
training as “helpful” to “extremely helpful” in “making the transition
to . . . early work assignments as a lawyer.”168 This positive finding for
clinical legal education comes with limitations, as Selbin and Sandefur
point out. Notably, the study only tested recent law graduates’ percep-
tion of how clinics prepared them for their careers, and not whether
clinics prepared them for their careers.
The question remains as to whether students actually translate
and transfer the proficiencies they learn in law school courses and
clinics to post-graduation practice.169 Intuitively, it would seem that
the closer the subject matter and skills learned in class are to actual
practice, the more easily a student can translate and transfer such
knowledge and skills to practice. Despite the observation that “no cli-
ent would entrust a multimillion dollar transaction to law students,”170
some transactional law clinics might be at an advantage in preparing
students for future practice precisely because they focus on the sub-
stantive law that students entering corporate practice post-graduation
will encounter and employ. And while for-profit companies generally
do not entrust their transactions to law students, many for-profit and
nonprofit start-up social enterprises will and do. This may have some-
thing to do with the age and outlook of social entrepreneurs them-
selves—they tend to be younger than the average corporate manager
and often view youth as characteristic of untapped talent and innova-
tion rather than inexperience. Additionally, the social entrepreneur-
ship ethos of “giving back” aligns with many social entrepreneurs’
aspirations to “give back” by facilitating law students learning “on the
job,” as they themselves have. Thus, students representing social en-
terprises in the SENL Clinic may very well engage in similar “start-
up” legal work that they will perform post-graduation.
However, aligning subject matter and skills taught in a clinic with
future practice alone is insufficient to ensure transfer of skills learned
168 Jeffrey Selbin & Rebecca Sandefur, The Clinic Effect, 16 CLIN. L. REV. 57, 83-85
(2009).
169 Kreiling, supra note 84, at 284 (“Unless law school clinical legal education is struc-
tured to teaching a method that can be transferred to and used in the world of professional
practice, the impact of clinical education on lawyer competency will be minimal.”); see also
supra note 14.
170 Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing Corporate Transactions into the Law School Class-
room, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 475, 485-86.
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in clinic to future practice. As stated above, a key component of
clinical legal education is reflective practice—i.e., the ability to learn
from one’s own experience. This is accomplished in the clinical setting
“by requiring students to articulate their ‘theories of action’ in recur-
ring professional settings,” comparing actual results to expected re-
sults, identifying ineffective practice and the reasons why the student’s
practice was ineffective, and providing quality feedback.171
CONCLUSION
This article has explained the reasons that the Social Enterprise
& Nonprofit Law Clinic explicitly engages in the study of social enter-
prise and corporate sustainability, and represents social enterprise cli-
ents. Such client selection helps prepare students for practice in a
corporate sector that increasingly emphasizes corporate sustainability.
Serving social enterprise clients acts as a catalyst for discussion and
understanding of corporate laws as they relate to pursuing financial,
social, and environmental objectives. Clinic students also learn valua-
ble problem-solving skills and engage in information facilitation and
knowledge creation essential to legal advocacy for an emerging sector.
The effect of the SENL Clinic’s approach will be borne out with time,
as alumni of the Clinic are tracked and surveyed about their experien-
tial experience and its impact on their post-graduation law practice.
171 Kreiling, supra note 84, at 291-95.
